The Policing of Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish and Canadian Counter-terrorism Responses

By

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Abstract

Police agencies assume a significant role in the creation and enforcement of government counter-terrorism strategies. Modern police organizations are tasked with preventing and responding to terrorism, in addition to their traditional policing duties of crime prevention, criminal investigation and order maintenance. However, despite the increment and spending on police counter-terrorism efforts, very little is known about the exact nature and effectiveness of police counter-terrorism strategies. Studying the policing of terrorism for a detailed understanding of what police are doing regarding counter-terrorism is a major requisite for terrorism researchers. Additionally, explaining why police agencies differ in their responses to terrorism is also critical in analyzing police counter-terrorism tactics. Although there exist studies that compare and contrast countries’ responses, there is not much comparative research on police organizations’ responses to terrorism. The current research develops a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Canadian police organizations’ responses to terrorism. Using data obtained on the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the main purpose of the current study is to explore and compare how international police organizations respond to terrorism. This thesis aims to advance the knowledge and practice of the police role in countering terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism, counter-terrorism, Turkish National Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, comparative analysis
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Chapter I
Introduction

Terrorism continues to represent a complex threat for national and global security. Various sub-state groups and nations have employed terrorism in the post-World War II era since modern terrorism is an “inexpensive, attractive and effective instrument for achieving political, social, economic and strategic objectives in violation of law” (Alexander, 2009, p. 4). Recent developments in communication, technology, means of transportation, conventional and unconventional weaponry have caused modern terrorists to employ terrorist propaganda and violence on an unprecedented scale. This has implications in terms of serious threats to global peace and security. Terrorism has therefore become a significant public policy issue within the past few decades and especially since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States. After the devastating attacks of 9/11, the world focused more attention on terrorism; however, terrorism was not invented on 9/11 (Roach, 2011). Terrorism was an issue long before 9/11 for countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Peru and Turkey, all of who have suffered from terrorist activities since 1970s (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006).

As a result of large scale global terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, and the announcement of the ‘war on terror’, terrorism is regarded as one of the most serious problems confronting modern societies. The need for efficient counter-terrorism policies has become an issue of paramount political and social concern (Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008). Governments all around the world are now confronted with the problem of how to effectively respond to terrorism and the changed terrorist threat. This problem has been made more complicated by the lack of international consensus regarding a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, and indeed has provoked extensive debate (Hanniman, 2007). The failure of the
United Nations (UN) to agree on a definition of terrorism has had a negative impact on how governments have responded to acts of terrorism (Roach, 2011). Defining terrorism is a problem which impedes a collective approach and satisfactory cooperation for combatting terrorism globally.

Terrorism represents a significant threat to states around the world; however, governments differ in their responses to the challenges of terrorism (Jacoby, 2004; Orttung, 2006). In terms of counter-terrorism strategies, governments have responded in various ways such as the use of diplomacy and the political process (executive and legislative), the use of law enforcement agencies, through the criminal justice system and the employment of militarized strategies (Jacoby, 2004). Responses of different countries to terrorism also have differed according to “their own particular histories and legal, political, and social cultures” (Roach, 2011, p. 1).

Terrorism has become an important subject matter across a wide range of social institutions such as politics, the military, law and police and the criminal justice (Deflem, 2010). Accordingly, the past few decades have witnessed an increase in scholarship regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism. However, some aspects of the field of terrorism studies have not received sufficient attention. As Deflem (2010, p. 1) argues, among these aspects, “the policing of terrorism presents an as-yet relatively unexplored and often not properly understood topic of research”.

Police organisations assume a significant role in the creation and enforcement of government counter-terrorism strategies and are increasingly required to combine law enforcement with tasks and responsibilities for national defence and homeland security (Pickering et al., 2008). The police agencies are now tasked with preventing and responding to terrorism, in addition to their traditional tasks for crime prevention, criminal investigation and order maintenance. Because terrorist activities are considered inherently criminal behaviours under the legislation of most nations,
police agencies frequently play a significant role in counter-terrorist operations (Martin, 2011). Today, police services in all democratic countries, centralized and non-centralized, are engaged in a wide range of counter-terrorism activities including investigating specific cases, tracking down suspected terrorists, disrupting/dismantling terrorist plots, community engagement for the prevention of terrorism and international police cooperation in counter-terrorism cases (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010). However, despite the proliferation and spending on police counter-terrorism efforts, very little is known about the exact nature and effectiveness of police counter-terrorism strategies and tactics (Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner, & Lieberman, 2009). Clearly, studying the policing of terrorism for a detailed understanding of what police are doing to counter terrorism is a major requisite for terrorism researchers and a currently missing component of terrorism studies. Moreover, according to Lum et al. (2009), explaining why law enforcement agencies differ in their responses is also imperative in analyzing police counter-terrorism tactics. Although there exist a few studies that compare and contrast countries’ responses to terrorism (Aktan & Koknar, 2002; Alexander, 2002; Lesser, 1999; Roach, 2011), there is not much comparative research on police organizations’ responses to terrorism and counter-terrorism policies and procedures.

This thesis is a modest attempt to fill this gap in the literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The study develops a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Canadian police organizations’ responses to terrorism. Two police organizations were selected for this study. The organizations being studied are the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In Turkey, the TNP is the leading agency responsible for the implementation of government counter-terrorism strategies and the enforcement of counter-terrorism tasks such as the prevention and investigation of terrorist activities. In Canada, the
RCMP is the primary national security and counter-terrorism policing agency responsible for the investigation of terrorism-related offences.

These countries were selected for a comparative analysis for a number of reasons. Turkey has a considerable experience in the field of counter-terrorism. Turkey’s experience in combatting terrorism is unique for several reasons (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). First, Turkey has a significant and complex geographical location in one of the most violent, instable and turbulent regions in the world. There have been ongoing conflicts in neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, conflicts between Palestine and Israel, and problems in Caucasus and Balkan regions. Turkey has been greatly affected by these conflicts and problems in different ways. There have been increasing acts of terrorism in and outside the country and the emergence of new terrorist groups. Turkey has become an important transit point for terrorists and terrorist related activity. This has included other illegal activities such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling. In addition to its position as a transit state in a geographical and physical sense, Turkey also acts as a vital link and a cultural bridge between the West and the Islamic world (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).

Second, Turkey, given its significant and complex geo-political and geo-strategic position, has been threatened by a wide range of terrorist groups including Marxist-Leninist (extreme leftist), religiously inspired (religiously exploiting) and ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist organizations (Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Orttung, 2006; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Sozen, 2006; Turkish National Police, 2014; Yilmaz, 2011). Acts of terrorism in Turkey have claimed approximately 40,000 lives including civilians and security forces over the last 30 years, and most of these losses were because of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism. However, Turkey also faces threats from Al-Qaeda linked or inspired terrorist networks and international terrorism. The car bombing of two synagogues and truck bombings of HSBC Bank and British Consulate in Istanbul
on 15-20 November 2003 were claimed by Turkish extremists linked to Al-Qaeda. These attacks left 62 people dead and more than 650 injured, and were in fact the deadliest terrorist incidents in Turkish history (Orttung, 2006). In addition to having the highest number of victims of terrorism within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Turkey has also suffered economically because of acts of terrorism (due to reduced investment and tourism) with an approximate cost of more than 100 billion US dollars to the country (Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Orttung, 2006).

Given Turkey’s extensive counter-terrorism experience and the fact that the Turkish government and security forces have been fighting against such a wide variety of terrorist groups (which differ in their ideological motives, methods, tactics, financing activities, membership profiles, recruitment strategies etc.), Turkey can be considered an ideal case study. The challenge of terrorism that Turkey faces, and its counter-terrorism policies and strategies warrant further scholarly research. Moreover, Turkey is a unique example of a NATO member (a non-Western country) facing a wide range of terrorist threats including jihadist/religiously motivated terrorism. Turkey’s counter-terrorism responses including the law enforcement response, should be subject to comparative evaluation/analysis with current Western responses to terrorism. This research is an attempt of such comparative evaluation and uses Canada as the Western country as its basis for comparative analysis of counter-terrorism policies.

Several reasons influenced the selection of Canada as a case in this study. Canada is familiar with terrorism and terrorist attacks on its soil since the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) terrorist campaign in 1970s. Although Canada does not have the same level of experience with terrorism as Turkey, it witnessed the terrorist bombing of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985 which was the deadliest act of aviation terrorism in world history before the attacks of 9/11 and
the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history (Public Safety Canada, 2013; Roach, 2006). Canada has also suffered from 9/11 terrorist attacks where twenty four Canadian citizens were killed. Recently, on 20 and 22 October 2014, Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism1 which left two Canadian Armed Forces members dead and one wounded. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Government of Canada have characterized both incidents as terrorist acts. Terrorism is, therefore, not a new issue for Canada and its citizens. Like Turkey, Canada has experienced acts of domestic and international terrorism.

Terrorism still constitutes a serious and persistent threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests abroad (Public Safety Canada, 2013). According to Public Safety Canada (2013), Canada faces threats from violent extremist groups at home and abroad, international terrorist groups and domestic issue-based extremism. Canada is being threatened by Al-Qaeda due to its position as the neighbour and strong ally of the US, as well as its leading role as an important actor in the fight against Al-Qaeda and global terrorism and its active military presence in Afghanistan (Jacoby, 2004; Wilner, 2009). All of these factors contribute to the identification of Canada as a legitimate target for terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and various other extremist groups.

When we look at how Canada has responded to terrorism historically, we observe that the terrorist attacks on 9/11, as for many Western countries, have been an important landmark for Canada in terms of counter-terrorism and national security efforts. Canada responded to 9/11 in multiple ways. For example, one of Canada’s responses to 9/11 was the enactment of the Anti-

1 On October 20, 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau deliberately rammed a car into a group of two Canadian Armed Forces members in a shopping centre parking lot in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. One soldier died and another soldier was wounded in this incident. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Government of Canada has characterized the incident as a terrorist act by an ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)-inspired terrorist. On October 22, 2014, a series of shootings happened in Ottawa in which Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo, a Canadian soldier on ceremonial sentry duty at the Canadian National War Memorial. This incident was classified by RCMP as a terrorist attack.
Terrorism Act (ATA), which included a broad definition of terrorism, new terrorism offences and extensive new anti-terrorism measures in the Canadian Criminal Code (Jacoby, 2004; Roach, 2011). The Anti-Terrorism Act also provided Canadian law enforcement agencies with broad new investigative tools such as investigative hearings and preventive arrests (Hanniman, 2007). The Canadian government has put into effect a legislation entitled Bill C-51 (the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015) which expands the powers of Canadian security agencies. Taking into account the foregoing discussion, Canada is considered to be an appropriate case for this study.

This thesis is a modest attempt at contributing to our understanding of the similarities and differences between counter-terrorism responses of law enforcement agencies, particularly Western and non-Western countries’ law enforcement organizations. It provides a critical and comparative examination of the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey and Canada. This comparative study aims to advance both knowledge and practice in regard to the police role in responding to terrorism and contribute to the efforts of countries against the global terrorist threat.

This thesis is organized in 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, research purposes and objectives. Chapter 2 introduces thoughts on the problem of terrorism. This chapter will focus on the definition and the explanations of terrorism to illustrate the concept of terrorism and will also attempt to give the reader background information regarding the role of police agencies in counter-terrorism. Chapter 3 provides a brief discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism activities in Turkey and Canada. Chapter 4 outlines the proposed methodology for the study. Chapter 5 examines critically counter-terrorism policies and response strategies of both countries’ national police agencies from a comparative perspective. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the thesis. This chapter consists of two parts. The first section focuses on a discussion of the issues
that are presented in the thesis. The second section offers some policy recommendations and directions for future research.
Chapter II

Review of the Literature

This chapter summarizes the key research literature on theories and responses to terrorism. In this chapter, some introductory thoughts regarding the problem of terrorism in general will be offered. This chapter focuses on the definition and the explanations of terrorism to illustrate the concept of terrorism and also attempts to give the reader information regarding the role of police agencies in counter-terrorism.

Defining Terrorism

The past few decades have witnessed an increase in the scholarship produced regarding terrorism. The definition of terrorism has been critical to this body of literature. According to Gergin, Balci and Eldivan (2009, p. 265), “terrorism is one of the most controversial terms that have little, if any, common consensus as to its true meaning”. There is no single, widely accepted or universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006; Klinger & Heal, 2011). Almost all definitions of terrorism include the mention of violence and the desire of those perpetrating the violence to influence the behaviour of those they target. However, agreement beyond these points of commonality is limited (Klinger & Heal, 2011). The absence of a single universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism unavoidably weakens the description, evaluation, prevention or effective intervention of terrorist activities. Defining terrorism is a problem which also impedes a collective approach and a satisfactory cooperation for combatting terrorism globally.

Despite the fact that terrorism has been a serious source of concern for the international community for decades, it is striking that the UN has not been able to provide a universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism up to now. Sezgin (2007, p. 32) states that “this is due to international affairs where the majority of nation-states work by principles of realism that sway states to pursue
their own national interests, instead of a common one”. Such an approach by states seems to be explained by the fact that terrorism is fundamentally and inherently political, and inevitably about the pursuit, acquisition and use of power to achieve political change (Hoffman, 2006). In spite of the fact that 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols for counter-terrorism purposes have been issued by the UN up until now, “many states have not been party to these international instruments or do not implement them, evidently due to political reasons” (Ozguler, 2008, p. 8).

Various definitions of terrorism have been proposed by a variety of institutions and scholars. There seem to be nearly as many definitions of terrorism as there are authorities studying them and agencies responsible for protecting the country against terrorism (Mullins & Thurman, 2011). Alex Schmid, in his book *Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data bases, and literature* (1983) discovered over one hundred definitions of terrorism. Though a discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, some of the more prominent and widely utilized examples of these definitions are discussed here. For example, the academic definition of terrorism by the UN is:

Any action… that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. (UN Office of Drugs and Crime, 2005)

The United Nations has not been able to offer a legal versus an academic definition. However, the Council of the European Union has adopted a working framework (Ozguler, 2008). According to this framework, particular offenses are considered as terrorist acts:

Given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (The Council of the European Union, 2002, p. 4).

There are many different legal definitions of terrorism in addition to these transnational-level definitions. For example, the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act (1991), describes terrorism as:

Any kind of criminal act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the republic as specified in the constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the state, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the state, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.

A remarkable point in the legal definition of terrorism by the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act is that the law stipulates that the act must be committed by a person or persons belonging to an organization. However, the law also specifies that a person who is not a member of a terrorist organization but commits crimes on behalf of the organization is also regarded as a terrorist offender. This definition points out that an individual act can be recognized as a terrorist offence whether the individual belongs to an organization or commits crimes on behalf of the organization despite not being a member of the organization.

Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) defines terrorism as:
An act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada.

Activities recognized as criminal within this context include death and bodily harm with the use of violence; endangering a person’s life; risks posed to the health and safety of the public; significant property damage; and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities or systems (Department of Justice, Canada, 2014).

The UK Terrorism Act 2006, defines terrorism as “the use and threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause” (Ozguler, 2008, p. 13). Similar to the legal definition of terrorism in the Criminal Code of Canada, the Act includes violence against people; significant property damage; putting into danger a person’s life, risks to the health or safety of the public and serious interference or disruption of essential services, facilities or systems are the fundamental actions addressed within the scope of the Act. The UK Terrorism Act 2006 also introduced a number of new offenses which are classified as “Acts Preparatory to Terrorism”, “Encouragement to Terrorism”, “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications”, and “Terrorist training offences” (Ozguler, 2008).

There are also many different definitions of terrorism developed by academic scholars. Forst (2009, p. 5) defines terrorism as “the premediated and unlawful use or threatened use of violence against a non-combatant population or target having symbolic significance, with the aim of either
inducing political or religious change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying a population identified as an enemy”. Black (2004, p. 10) defines terrorism in its purest form as “unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians”. Black (2004, p. 9) also sees pure terrorism as a “distinctive form of social control partly akin to warfare that arises with a particular social geometry”. Hoffman (2006, p. 2-3) defines terrorism as “violence–or, equally important, the threat of violence– used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim”. According to Agnew (2010), terrorism is defined as the commission of criminal acts, usually violent, that target civilians or violate conventions of war when targeting military personnel, and that are committed at least partly for social, political, or religious ends.

Different governmental agencies also have developed their own definitions of terrorism. In some cases, however, different departments or agencies inside the same government have different definitions of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006; Mullins & Thurman, 2011). The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use –or threatened use of- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (Mullins & Thurman, 2011, p. 42). The 1986 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Mullins & Thurman, 2011, p. 43). The Department of Homeland Security defines terrorism as any activity that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and … must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (Hoffman, 2006, p. 31). Each of these institutional
definitions of terrorism reflects the priorities and specific interests of their respective agencies (Hoffman, 2006).

Kastanidou (2004, p. 18) argues that, “terrorism is a phenomenon pertaining to social and political life, and its definition within the framework of criminal law cannot be disassociated from its social and political milieu”. For this reason, each legal definition of terrorism as a crime should also “reflect the opinion of the political and social culture to which it belongs” (Sezgin, 2007, p. 33). This basically means that a consensus among the various components of the society and different governmental agencies is required for the enactment of even a national definition of terrorism. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to achieve a unanimously agreed upon declarative definition of terrorism at the global level by states.

There are also several other reasons which complicate the establishment of a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism. First, the term terrorism is fundamentally and inherently political which sometimes render the cooperation between states impossible (Hoffman, 2006). As the concept of terrorism is usually subject to political evaluations, for example, an entity’s freedom fighter for today may become the same entity’s terrorist tomorrow (Sezgin, 2007). Similarly, today’s terrorist can easily be labeled peacemaker tomorrow depending on the variable political factors at work.

A second point which complicates our ability to define terrorism is the changing nature of terrorism over time (Mullins & Thurman, 2011). There have been significant shifts in terrorist organizations and terrorist activities over the past two hundred years. For example, the word “terrorism” first became popular during the French Revolution and had a clearly positive implication at that time unlike its modern usage because it was used as a means to establish order during the anarchical period following the revolution (Hoffmann, 2006). In the following decades,
the usage of the term terrorism has been expanded to include a variety of interpretations (Sezgin, 2007). While terrorism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was predominantly associated with the activities of anarchists and social revolutionaries, Marxist/Leninist groups were active in 1960s and 1970s when nationalist and ethnic separatist groups –such as the Quebecois separatist group FLQ, the Basque ETA (Euskadita Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque Homeland), and Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK-Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) also started to employ terrorism for their purposes. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on US soil redefined terrorism yet again (Hoffman, 2006). Mullins and Thurman (2011) argue that terrorism has numerous manifestations which must be perceived in the context of time, social parameters, political elements, economic conditions and other social dynamics.

The other significant obstacles for establishing a single, precise definition of terrorism are; a lack of consensus on the typologies of terrorism and terrorists, the relationship of the concept of terrorism with seemingly similar concepts, such as guerilla warfare, insurgency or freedom fighting. The vague nature of the term terrorism means it has been (and is) used to indicate a wide variety of aggressive action by human beings against others. Terrorist organizations select and utilize names to describe themselves which avoid the word “terrorism” (use of names such as army, self-defence movement, brigade, revolutionary, liberation army/front or as state with redrawn boundaries) to get rid of their terrorist image in public opinion and at the global level. There has been a change in the attitudes of states towards certain activities over time which leads to the relabeling of certain activities as terrorist. One such example is the US government’s designation of the Afghan mujahedeen as terrorists after 9/11 while previously it was supporting the mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s and labeling them as struggling freedom fighters.
There have also been debates on the target side of terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism regard “innocents” or “non-combatants” as the targets of terrorism. However, as in the example of the PKK, terrorists can also target combatants (active military units), therefore, a definition excluding “combatants” as target may not be agreed on by a state that is dealing with separatist terrorism and trying to suppress it by the use of military force (Forst, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Klinger & Heal, 2011; Mullins & Thurman, 2011; Ozguler, 2008; Sezgin, 2007).

Although there is a comprehensive list of definitions offered by different sources and these definitions may differ from each other, there are some common elements included in these definitions of terrorism. According to Schmid (2013a), the most common dimensions included in 109 different definitions of terrorism are the use of violence or force (83.5 percent of the definitions), political aims (65 percent), emphasize of fear or terror (51 percent), the threat of violence (47 percent), psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5 percent), victim-target differentiation (37.5 percent) and the act being purposive, planned, systematic and organized (32 percent) (see Table 1).

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2 This list is not exhaustive in part because many new definitions may have been added since 1984 and particularly since 9/11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Violence, force</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Political</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fear, terror emphasized</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Threat</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Victim-target differentiation</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Publicity aspect</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Intimidation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Innocence of victims emphasized</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Clandestine, covert nature</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Criminal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Demands made on third parties</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The most common dimensions included in 109 definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2013a)

Hoffman (2006) states that terrorism is inevitably political in aims and motives, violent or threatens violence, intended to have widespread psychological influences beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by either an organization or individuals or a small collection of individuals inspired by existing terrorist movements and committed by a subnational group or non-state entity. Mullins and Thurman (2011, p. 45) argue that a few common threads emerge from the examination of the listed definitions, however, “these tendencies are far from universal”. They further note that violence is a tool employed by terrorists but not a goal of terrorism. Terrorism implicates violence or threatened violence, terrorism is political, instigating fear in the audience is
the goal of terrorism and violence is aimed at those who might be watching (Mullins & Thurman, 2011).

As it is apparent from the abovementioned explanations, some definitions of terrorism focus on perpetrators, others focus on targets or goals of the attackers, yet others focus on victims and still others on the techniques of the attacks. With the usage of certain definitions, many acts of terrorism can be excluded or many non-terrorist acts can be included. For example, when attacks against combatants rather than civilians are not regarded as terrorist acts pursuant to some definitions of terrorism, PKK’s terrorist actions against Turkish military targets or the bombing of the USS Cole destroyer by Al-Qaeda while harbored in Yemen in 2000 can be omitted from the definition of terrorism. However, these two examples are clearly and undoubtedly terrorist actions conducted by PKK which is listed by the US and the European Union as a terrorist organisation and Al-Qaeda which is responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Gergin et al. (2009) argue that the exclusion of attacks towards military or police officer combatants from the definition of terrorism could lead to the possibility that some terrorists can be considered as freedom fighters and some countries might avoid cooperating with others in the struggle against terrorist organisations or even support them. In sum, defining terrorism remains a very controversial and political issue and the identification of the common elements in the definitions of terrorism, also, does not get us any closer to answering the question of what terrorism is or is not.

The absence of definitional clarity about terrorism presents significant challenges for government officials who are tasked with preventing and responding to terrorist acts and for scholars who are involved in terrorism research. In terms of academic studies, the lack of a clear definition of terrorism complicates clearly defining which types of actions comprise the subject matter that the scholars would like to study. This in turn prevents the emergence of a compelling
body of terrorism scholarship (Klinger & Heal, 2011). The absence of an adequate body of literature in terrorism studies will hinder our further understanding of terrorism and terrorists. Much of the scholarly work on terrorism has been produced by political scientists and our knowledge of terrorism has generally remained limited to political and religious explanations (Forst, Greene, & Lynch, 2011). In terms of public policy, the absence of a clear terrorism definition creates ramifications for societies dealing with terrorism to develop means for preventing terrorism and responding to terrorist attacks which already happened (Klinger & Heal, 2011).

**Explanations of Terrorism**

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon with different forms, dimensions and manifestations (Ozguler, 2008; McAllister & Schmid, 2013). As a result of this complex nature, terrorism has been studied by scholars in a multidisciplinary perspective. This multidisciplinary approach to terrorism has resulted in theories of terrorism coming from a variety of backgrounds such as political science, international relations, psychology, sociology, economics, criminology and criminal justice, history, military science, law, ethnic and religious studies and conflict resolution studies (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Although there exists no general theory of terrorism due to a lack of consensus on a common definition of terrorism and the diversity of the phenomenon (McAllister & Schmid, 2013), terrorism theories can be classified into five categories depending on their point of interest:

- Psychological theories;
- Radicalization theories;
- Structural theories;
- Organizational (institutional) theories;
Psychological theories focus on individual factors for the explanation of participation in terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1981; Horgan, 2003; Silke, 2003). Theories of radicalization focus on the processes through which individuals become socialized into engaging in political violence without moral restraints (Moghadam, 2005; Silbner & Bhatt, 2007; Sprinzak, 1991). Structural theories, on the other hand, investigate the systemic causes of terrorist violence such as economic, political and cultural factors (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006; Crenshaw, 1981; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Ross, 1993). Organizational theories of terrorism focus on the effects of organizations on individual behaviour and “picture terrorism resulting from internal dynamics of political organizations” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013; Yilmaz, 2009, p. 36). Finally, strategic (rational) choice theories assume that terrorist acts are the result of terrorists’ rational calculation of the costs and benefits of their actions (Crenshaw, 1988; Pape, 2003). In the following, I will briefly outline major works in the abovementioned theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of terrorism.

**Psychological theories of terrorism.** The psychological explanations of terrorism basically attempt to answer the question of whether or not there is a terrorist personality. Existing psychological research on terrorism generally focuses on why individuals participate in terrorist organizations? Why they exit such organizations? and what the influences of membership in a terrorist organization are on the individual members? (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). However, while trying to find the personal factors which make an individual likely to join a terrorist organization, psychological theories of terrorism suffer from some deficiencies because they are based on “theoretical speculation or merely anecdotal empirical evidence” (McAllister & Schmid,
2013, p. 214). Following are some prominent examples of the research on psychological causes of terrorism.

Crenshaw (1981), emphasizing the complex nature of personality-politics relationship, points out the invalidity of a single motivation or personality in explaining all circumstances of terrorism. Instead, she argues that terrorists are normal individuals and she rejects the idea of a psychological predisposition to terrorism which may be recognized in advance. Crenshaw (1981) argues that because terrorists have a high level of commitment to group purposes, it will be more appropriate to investigate the psychological mechanisms of group interaction rather than the psychological predispositions of individual terrorist group members. According to Crenshaw (1981), rather than being a response to an inner call, terrorism results from a progressive development of commitment and opposition which moreover depends on government action.

Horgan (2003) categorizes the application of psychology to studies of terrorism as dealing with individual psychology and the other dealing with how individuals are influenced by organizational membership. He rejects the idea that terrorists possess abnormal psychological traits and detailed studies on this issue in fact show that most terrorists are normal individuals in a clinical sense (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Horgan (2003), by comparing the terrorist violence and the apolitical violence of psychopaths, demonstrates that the individual patterns of a professional terrorist’s life do not promote abnormal personalities. Horgan (2003) states that pursuing collective goals and displaying extreme fidelity and dedication which are some common characteristics of terrorist organization members do not fit well with individuals having abnormal psychological attributes. Additionally, terrorist organizations will abstain from recruiting such individuals with extreme personalities due to security reasons. In addition to examining why
individuals join terrorist organizations, Horgan (2003) also focused on individuals’ remaining in the terrorist organizations and the process of leaving terrorist organizations.

Silke (2003) emphasizes the importance of first-hand psychological research, such as conducting personal interviews with individual terrorists, because studies which claim to provide evidence for abnormal personality traits of terrorists generally come from researchers employing only secondary sources of data. He argues that terrorist organization membership is the consequence of particular processes which share common factors and can be modelled by psychologists. According to Silke (2003), many terrorists have a tendency for identifying with groups where the individuals experience some kind of marginalization. Silke (2003) also argues that the process of individual radicalization might be related to factors such as a feeling of injustice, a desire for personal status and awards, and a need for protection.

**Radicalization theories of terrorism.** Researchers who study terrorism often focus on the phenomenon of how individuals become violent radicals? McAllister and Schmid (2013, p. 217) define radicalization as “a process of ideological socialization of (usually) young people towards effectuating fundamental political changes, usually through the use of violent tactics of conflict waging against the political enemies and their followers””. Some radicalization studies focus on the personal abnormalities whereas others center upon the external (structural or institutional) conditions influencing the transformation of normal individuals to fanatical terrorists.

Moghadam (2005) explains the process of radicalization with a step model that elaborates six phases of violent radicalization. In this work, Moghadam (2005) utilizes an example of a six-storey building in which each floor represents a phase of the radicalization process. On the ground floor, individuals develop a sense of injustice based on their cognitive analysis of the structural circumstances and feel relatively deprived. On the first floor, these individuals try to find solutions
to these unjust conditions and “explore various options to improving material or political circumstances” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013, p. 219). On the second floor, individuals begin to accuse other groups for injustice and displace their aggression onto them. On the third floor, they begin to engage with terrorist organizations and rationalize the use of violence and terrorism as a justified strategy for the solution. Individuals are ready to join the terrorist organization and adopt its values in the fourth floor. In the fifth floor, individuals are actively trained, equipped and allowed to engage in terrorist activities. In the sixth floor, individuals get involved in terrorist actions.

Another study on the process of individual radicalization was conducted by Silbner and Bhatt (2007). McAllister and Schmid (2013) argue that Silbner and Bhatt’s (2007) more grounded theory of radicalization is advantageous to empirical observations when compared to the study of Moghadam. In their study, Silbner and Bhatt (2007) contemplated four steps in the radicalization process:

1. Pre-radicalization (the normal and ordinary life of individuals),
2. Self-identification (the stage where individuals are first engaged with extremist views and radical beliefs by the influence of both internal and external factors, keep company with the individuals having the same kind of radical views and adopt this ideology as their own),
3. Indoctrination (intensive reinforcement and complete assimilation of radical ideology by the influence of peer groups), and
4. Jihadization (Accepting oneself as holy warrior or mujahedeen and planning and accomplishment of the terrorist act).
Silbner and Bhatt (2007), concluded that there is no instrumental psychological profile that will help predict who will follow the whole pathway to radicalization. However, they observed a significant consistency in the behaviours and direction of each of the plots across all the phases despite differences in circumstances and environment in each of the cases. Such a consistency might offer a possible tool for prediction (McAllister & Schmid, 2013).

**Structural theories of terrorism.** A strong and diverse field of study has been developed around the investigation of structural (systemic) causes of terrorism (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). The structural causes of terrorism can be classified as political, economic and cultural.

In her study regarding the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw (1981, p. 379) argues that the study of terrorism can be framed around three questions: “why terrorism occurs? how the process of terrorism works? and what its social and political effects are?”. By identifying terrorism as a form of political behaviour depending on deliberate choices of rational actors (including terrorist organizations), Crenshaw (1981) argues that an extensive analysis of causes and motivations for terrorism should also focus on structural variables and the probable influence of broad social, political, and economic conditions on terrorist violence. Additionally, based on the fact that not all individuals who experience a given situation practice terrorism, the possible psychological parameters which may foster or restrain individual participation in terrorist violence also need to be investigated (Crenshaw, 1981). In her analysis, Crenshaw (1981) classifies the factors which influence terrorism as *preconditions* and *precipitants*.

*Preconditions* for terrorism involve enabling or permissive factors which “provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). Preconditions can basically be assumed as the situations which facilitate the creation and growth of terrorism. These conditions create an environment
where terrorism is possible. According to Crenshaw (1981), permissive causes for terrorism are: modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, broad attitudes and beliefs which condone terrorism and a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. On the other hand, precipitants can be considered as the reasons or direct causes of terrorism. These circumstances are basically the “background conditions that positively encourage resistance to the state” and “provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383). Crenshaw (1981) notes that concrete dissatisfaction among an ethnic minority subjected to discrimination by the majority, the lack of opportunity for political expression and participation, mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction and precipitating events such as government use of unexpected and extreme force against peaceful protest or reform attempts might be considered as direct causes of terrorism.

Ross (1993) identified three categories of theories which can explain the most prominent causes of oppositional political terrorism: structural, psychological and rational choice theories. Structural theories assume that “the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies” (Ross, 1993, p. 317). According to Ross (1993), structural variables of terrorism are much easier to operationalize and measure compared to psychological and rational choice ones, therefore, a causal model employing structural variables would define clearly the dominant processes by which terrorism takes place. Additionally, such a kind of causal model with more specific variables might have an advantage of better predictive ability. In his general causal model in which structural variables of terrorism were integrated, structural causes of terrorism were specified by Ross (1993) as the following:

1. Permissive causes:
   - Geographical location (Urban vs rural areas)
   - Type of political system
2. Precipitant causes:

- Social, cultural, and historical facilitation
- Organizational development or split
- Presence of other forms of political unrest
- Support
- Counterterrorist organization failure
- Availability of weapons and explosives
- Grievances

Ross (1993) argues that these structural factors interact with each other to cause terrorism. He further states that the general structural causal model of the conditions of terrorism that he proposed might be a better foundation for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the causes of terrorism.

In their study investigating the relationship between human rights conditions and terrorist activities, Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006, p. 773) suggest a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the generation and advancement of terrorism within a state and argue that “states which deny subsistence rights along with civil and political rights create an environment that is conducive to the development of terrorism”. However, according to Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) the state violation of security rights is a necessary condition for the genesis and growth of terrorism. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006), in their investigation of the causes of terrorism in Northern Ireland, found that restrictions on the political and civil rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland played an important role in the creation of terrorism and more significantly, violations of security rights of individuals increased the
number of Irish people who supported and got involved in terrorist activity. In sum, the writers argue that the violations of human security rights are directly connected to the generation and expansion of terrorism in a state and policies produced to alleviate terrorism necessitate addressing these rights.

Among the structural theories of terrorism, there are also economic theories of terrorism which attempt to link terrorism with “economic underperformance, or marginalization” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013, p. 249). Ted R. Gurr is a pioneering theorist who proposed a systematic analysis of the connection between political violence and economic marginalization (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). In the context of his relative deprivation theory, rather than demonstrating a direct relationship between political violence and economic deprivation, Gurr pictured rebellion as a result of political frustration which emanated from “the gap between the perception of individual entitlement, and the reality of goal attainment” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013, p. 249).

Krueger and Maleckova (2003), tested the relationship between poverty at the individual level and the probability of participation in Lebanon’s Hezbollah among the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They found no support for the link between poverty and the participation in a terrorist organization. They noted that, compared with the relevant population, members of Hezbollah's militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families. Krueger and Maleckova (2003, p. 119) argue that “any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak”. The writers also argue that rather than viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.
Organizational (institutional) theories of terrorism. Underground organizations and the environments in which they operate have been subject to a significant amount of research. According to McAllister and Schmid (2013, p. 226), “organizational-level analysis allows the researcher to concentrate on issues of central concern to the discourse such as how institutions frame goals, mobilize resources, articulate strategies, recruit and maintain members? and (from a counter-terrorism perspective) what factors initiate institutional decline?” One of the major theoretical approaches to studying terrorist organizations is Martha Crenshaw’s (1988) work on organizational process theory (OPT). Crenshaw (1988) proposed an organizational (institutional) theory of terrorism which focuses on the internal politics of the organization. Organizational process theory suggests that the primary objective of any political organization is to maintain its existence regardless of achieving political goals. Crenshaw (1988, p. 19) argues that “terrorist behaviour represents the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic action”. As the survival of the terrorist group is the primary objective, recruitment of new members and keeping the existing ones is of great importance. This theory explains the reasons for joining a terrorist organization not only in terms of ideological commitment but also in accordance with various personal motivations. For example, incentives such as a feeling of belonging to a group, attaining social status and reputation, seeking excitement and the possibility to obtain material benefits encourage people to join terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1988). Organizational objectives are not necessarily fixed and the explication of ideology will change according to the need to maintain organizational survival (Crenshaw, 1988). Leaders of terrorist organizations strive to maintain solidarity and cohesion amongst group members and provide incentives for them. Also, terrorist groups are sensitive to the expression of dissent and factionalism, therefore,
they try to restrict departure from and suppress dissidence within the organization to be able to maintain group survival.

According to Crenshaw (1988), the key vulnerability of violent organizations is the inability to attract and retain (new) members rather than the inability of a group to achieve political goals. Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts should focus on the recruitment and retention rates of terrorist organizations. Encouragement of fragmentation within the terrorist groups, proposing new and non-violent incentives, offering opportunities for exit to non-violent political methods, encouraging the expression of oppositional ideas among the terrorist organization, increasing the costs of joining a terrorist organization with strict legal penalties and offers of amnesty are some policy options for disrupting terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1988).

**Rational choice (strategic) theories of terrorism.** Crenshaw (1988) proposed an instrumental theory of terrorism which conceptualizes it as a rational choice by political actors that aim to produce radical changes in political and social circumstances. According to the instrumental model, “terrorism is one form of violent coercion, a bargaining process based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of overt military force” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 13). Terrorism is an instrument to achieve political aims and is used by non-state groups that are supposed to act by calculating the costs and benefits of their terrorist actions. According to this theory, the purpose of terrorism is to produce a change in the government's political position, not the destruction of military potential (Crenshaw, 1988). Instrumental theory of terrorism suggests that increasing the costs of terrorism and decreasing its benefits and rewards will render terrorism less attractive and probable.

In terms of combatting terrorism, this model proposes two basic options for governments: *defense* and *deterrence* (Crenshaw, 1988). Defense option includes *pre-emptive* actions which aim
to stop the enemy who is ready to mount an imminent attack and *preventive* actions which intend to disrupt an attacker who is planning a forthcoming attack but has not yet mobilized (Crenshaw, 1988). Deterrence strategy, on the other hand, aims to influence the adversary’s motivation for terrorist action by convincing him that the costs of the planned action exceed the benefits he might get. Deterrence strategy involves measures such as denial of the gain to the adversary, punishment or retaliation (Crenshaw, 1988). These responses are designed in order to decrease the reward and increase the cost of terrorism.

Another study regarding the strategic choice of terrorism was conducted by Pape (2003). In his study which investigates the suicide terrorism specifically, Pape (2003) suggests that suicide terrorism has followed a strategic logic with the purpose of compelling liberal democracies to make remarkable territorial concessions. Pape (2003) argues that the prominence of suicide terrorism has not been a result of religious indoctrination or prevalence of psychological abnormalities which might encourage individual suicide bombers but a result of the perception of the terrorist groups that suicide terrorism pays. Pape (2003) argues that although the individual suicide attackers may be irrational or psychologically abnormal, the leadership of the terrorist organization which recruits and directs the militants are not. Pape (2003) argues that most suicide terrorism is committed as a strategic tool for achieving political goals and it is not merely a product of irrational individuals or a fruit of religious fanaticism. Pape (2003) also demonstrates the timing, purposes and the intended targets of the suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001 as the evidence of a strategic approach by terrorist groups rather than a nonstrategic response driven mainly by fanaticism or irrational hatreds.
Responding to Terrorism

Terrorism produces a significant threat to the security and stability of democratic nations. Systematic and long-term terrorism may result in the restriction of civil liberties, the violation of the human rights of citizens, disruption in the normal functioning of democratic institutions, interference with the functioning of elected representatives, and a hindrance on the development of civil society (Reinares, 1998). Any legitimately constituted government must therefore, respond to the threat of terrorism. Counter-terrorism basically refers to state policies which are aimed at preventing or eliminating terrorist environments and groups (Martin, 2014). From a policing perspective, Bayley and Weisburd (2009) describe counter-terrorism as a type of high policing which refers to the covert actions of intelligence collection and disruption directed against people considered to be terrorists. From a political perspective, according to Deflem (2010, p. 13) “counter-terrorism involves measures taken by the governments of national states and by international governing bodies”.

Democratic states and their intelligence and law enforcement organizations may employ various counter-terrorism strategies and procedures, however, the ultimate goal of counter-terrorism policies is to save lives by disrupting or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks (Martin, 2014). In order to achieve this goal, counter-terrorism entails the use of all convenient tools including intelligence, military, law enforcement, diplomatic, social and economic tools. Acknowledging the costs and benefits of each approach and selecting in each case the particular tool which is most effective under the circumstances is of utmost importance for the success of counter-terrorism efforts (Kris, 2011).

The literature on terrorism offers a wide range of counter-terrorism strategies and measures employed by states to deal with the causes and consequences of terrorist activities (Deflem, 2010).
Such policy options open to police and government officials in their efforts to combat terrorism include but are not limited to intelligence gathering, disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots, target hardening against terrorist attacks, criminal investigation of terrorist incidents, community engagement for prevention of violent extremism, increasing public awareness to reduce sympathy for the terrorist cause, protection of critical infrastructure, diplomacy, negotiation and concessions, social and political reforms, international cooperation, international agreements, legislative efforts, increasing security expenditures/personnel, repression of human and civil rights, coercive and nonviolent covert operations, military and paramilitary suppression campaigns and international warfare (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Martin, 2014; Shor, 2010). These policies and strategies can also be classified in a number of ways such as proactive (defensive) vs. reactive (offensive) measures, repressive and violent measures vs. conciliatory policies, short-term vs. long term measures, measures directed at individuals and measures directed at a collective or groups (Shor, 2010). This list is not exhaustive and there are other typologies offered by the literature on terrorism.

**Law Enforcement as a Counter-Terrorism Tool**

Counter-terrorism is a multi-dimensional process and requires the effective use of a variety of tools. Military, intelligence, diplomacy, economic and social policies, and law enforcement are the primary instruments employed by the states for preventing and combatting terrorist activities. Among these instruments, law enforcement plays a vital and exclusive role as terrorism almost always involves a form of law breaking and all terrorism is eventually local, especially in terms of impacts (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007, Greene & Herzog, 2009). Today, terrorism is defined as a serious offence in the criminal codes of most nations. Correspondingly, in most parts of the world, it is the national, federal, state or local
police agencies that are tasked with the prevention, detection and investigation of this unique
offence. Terrorist activities may also involve the commission of other non-violent or violent crimes
such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, armed robbery, extortion, money laundering, homicide
and arson. In that sense, terrorism requires more police attention than many other types of crimes.
Accordingly, preventive efforts and investigative tools associated with crime prevention and
detection, are also applicable to terrorism.

On the other hand, the rarity of incidents of terrorism, and the differing nature of terrorist
acts and its perpetrators from other types of crimes and criminals, complicate things for the police
145) state “in all likelihood, policing terrorism is different than policing crime, although the two
occasionally overlap”. The fact that terrorists and ordinary criminals have different motivations
and goals in perpetrating their actions (political vs. personal gain) and that terrorist attacks result
in much more destruction and extreme fear when successful compared to common crimes, suggests
that policing terrorism can be more challenging than policing ordinary crimes.

Although counter-terrorism is not a new function for police agencies of countries such as
Turkey, United Kingdom, Israel, and Spain, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the global terrorist
threat afterwards have placed counter-terrorism as a central priority for law enforcement agencies
of many countries across the world. Since 9/11, police services across the world have “increasingly
examined, discussed, developed, or revised technologies, tactics, strategies, interagency
agreements, standard operating procedures, and other policy options in an effort to prepare for,
assess the risk of, and prevent future events of terrorism” (Lum et al., 2009, p. 101).

From a criminological viewpoint, counter-terrorism can be examined as a matter of social
control, including various mechanisms and institutions which define and respond to terrorism
(Deflem, 2010). As the primary agents of social control, police services are then actively involved in counter-terrorism activities. According to Deflem (2010, p. 6) “counter-terrorism-from the police point of view-is not a matter of war oriented at enemies but a matter of crime control oriented at criminal suspects approached on the basis of professional standards of policing”. This, in turn, facilitates a common understanding of terrorism and encourages cooperation between police institutions around the world. In many countries, today, law enforcement organizations are the leading agencies responsible for preventing and responding to terrorism. Bayley and Weisburd (2009), in their study examining the national structures of counter-terrorism in Western democracies, found that all national (centralized) police agencies engage in counter-terrorism with the exception of Sweden. They also found that all countries that authorize the creation of police at subnational, decentralized levels require them to undertake counter-terrorism operations. According to Bayley and Weisburd’s (2009) findings, police in all democratic countries, centralized and noncentralized, are authorized to engage in counter-terrorism activities. Counter-terrorism, then, seems to impact all levels of policing (national, federal, provincial, state or local) to a certain extent.

In terms of what police do for preventing and responding to terrorist acts, it can be observed that there are many functions carried out by law enforcement in this specialized area. For example, Kris (2011, p. 7) states that law enforcement “disrupts terrorist plots through arrests, incapacitates terrorists through incarceration after prosecution, and it can be used to obtain intelligence from terrorists or their supporters through interrogation, and through recruiting them as cooperating assets”. In answering the same question, Bayley and Weisburd (2009, p. 87) state that the police can be involved in “covert detection, disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots, risk analysis, target hardening, community mobilization for prevention, protection of important persons and
infrastructure, emergency assistance at terrorist incidents, order maintenance when terrorism occurs, mitigation of terrorist damage, and criminal investigation of terrorist incidents”.

In their study on policing terrorism in Israel, Perliger, Hasisi, and Pedahzur (2009) argue that police forces are a central player in the democratic struggle against terrorism given the fact that both police and terrorist groups share the civilian arena as their theaters of action. According to Perliger et al. (2009), police services provide inherent advantages in counter-terrorism in three main realms: gathering intelligence on terrorist activities, thwarting of terrorist attacks through defensive and offensive measures, and restoration of terror sites. Police agencies are also involved in international cooperation against terrorism. Through bilateral and multilateral information sharing on suspected terrorists and through joint operations, police agencies are actively engaged in global counter-terrorism efforts. Additionally, international police organizations such as Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) and Europol (European Police Office) contribute to the accomplishment of cooperation among police agencies in terrorism matters (Deflem, 2010).

In summary, police services are one of the major tools for preventing, investigating and disrupting terrorism in democratic nations. Despite the war on terror rhetoric that “we are at war, our enemies in this war are not common criminals, therefore we should fight them using military and intelligence methods” and “the war on terror is not just a simple law enforcement matter”, the role of police institutions in the fight against terrorism cannot be underestimated or negated (Deflem, 2010; Kris, 2011). As a result, the de-politicization of terrorism in favor of an understanding of terrorism as a crime, increases the importance attached to inter-agency cooperation in counter-terrorism tasks. This includes successful police operations and disruptions of terrorist plots across the world, successful terrorism charges and convictions, and the efforts for
the adaptation of concepts such as “community policing” and “intelligence-led policing” to the policing of terrorism. Thus, the roles and responsibilities of police agencies in counter-terrorism domain appear to be expanding. Nevertheless, different characteristics of terrorist acts and their perpetrators also suggest that police have a crucial but a much more challenging role in policing terrorism than ordinary crime.
CHAPTER III

Turkish and Canadian Counter-Terrorism Experience

In order to understand counter-terrorism and homeland security related approaches, strategies and policies followed by the Turkish and Canadian law enforcement agencies, it will first be important to understand the historical, political, and institutional contexts in which these organizations operate. This chapter will provide the reader with background information about these contexts in which the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) operate.

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Turkey

Established in 1923, following a costly war of independence against the occupying powers, the security of the Republic of Turkey has been dictated by two main elements: geography and longstanding ties with the neighboring countries (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Turkey has a significant geostrategic position in one of the most violent and volatile regions of the world. While Turkey faced and was concerned with the Soviet threat two and a half decades ago, it is now influenced by the political, economic and security developments in the Middle East, Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions. Turkey is now a pivotal security player in these regions and beyond. As Lefebvre (2005, p. 105) states, pursuing its stakes in these regions and beyond, Turkey “has become a more assertive and independent actor on the international stage”.

In the post-Second World War era, Turkey chose to ally with the Western Bloc and consequently this policy led Turkey to become a member of NATO on 18 February 1952 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Since then, Turkey has acted as a strong confederate of NATO alliance and NATO has been the cornerstone of Turkey's defense and security policy (Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). During the Cold War era, Turkey made a significant contribution to the defense and security of the NATO Alliance. Having the longest border with the former Soviet Union, Turkey was strategically the most significant country in terms of defending one-third of the Alliance's land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). At the same time, Turkey also strived to alleviate tensions and conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey began to adjust itself to the changing security environment. However, NATO remained as a significant determinant in Turkish foreign, defense and security policy (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

The geostrategic importance of Turkey, however, has not declined with the end of the Cold War (Lefebvre, 2005). Turkey, as a charter member of the UN, a stanch member of NATO alliance, and as a country aiming to become a full member of the European Union (EU), remains a key ally of the US and Western countries. While strengthening its relations with the US and European countries; Turkey is also developing its relations with countries in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa, Southern Caucasus, South and Central Asia (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the world experienced a rapid change accelerated by globalization (Yilmaz, 2011). Globalization and rapid scientific developments have contributed to positive developments such as increasing communication and relations between countries and people, but also to the emergence of global risks and challenges that concern international security such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime and illegal immigration. As such, Turkey is also subject to many issues of current international concern and challenges such as security threats from neighbouring countries or terrorist groups, energy supplies important for its security, economic development and their geographical routing, or foreign perceptions of its respect for human rights (Lefebvre, 2005).
One of the major challenges Turkey is currently facing is the threat of terrorism which seriously compromises international security, especially in and around the Middle East region. Turkey has experienced sporadic and relentless subnational and state-sponsored terrorism for several decades (Yilmaz, 2011). Terrorism has been a leading problem for Turkey in terms of economic, cultural, political and military aspects particularly since the beginning of 1960s. The terrorist activities that so far have affected Turkey derive from ideological, religious and ethnic sources. In the 1970s, Armenian terrorist organizations started targeting Turkish diplomats (Haberfeld, King, & Lieberman, 2009). Members of ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide) murdered 71 people including 34 Turkish diplomats, their family members and civilians in their terrorist attacks throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Turkish National Police, 2014).

Left-wing terrorist groups have also been active in Turkey for the past few decades. Extreme leftist terrorist groups espousing a Marxist/Leninist ideology sought to destroy the current political system and overthrow the government through a revolution for the purposes of establishing a Marxist regime. DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), TKP/ML (Turkish Communist Party/Marxist Leninist), MKP (Maoist Communist Party) and MLKP (Marxist Leninist Communist Party) are the prominent left-wing terrorist organizations acting in Turkey. Among these, DHKP/C is the most active one with its activities mainly focusing on armed attacks, assassinations, suicide bombings, illegal demonstrations and fundraising through racketeering, extortion, burglary, robbery and other thefts, donations and drug smuggling (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Turkish National Police, 2014). DHKP/C mainly targets current and former government officials, law enforcement members and US and Western interests. On February 1, 2013, a DHKP/C member conducted a suicide attack against the US embassy in
Ankara, Turkey resulting in the death of the perpetrator and a Turkish security guard serving in the embassy. This suicide attack against one of the most protected sites in Turkey clearly reveals the threat potential of DHKP/C for Turkey and its allies.

Turkey has been dealing with separatist/ethno-nationalist terrorism since the beginning of the 1980s. The southeastern part of Turkey has been a major area of conflict in regard to the Kurdish population, which is estimated to be between 12 and 15 million. In the last three decades a significant portion of the terrorist incidents in Turkey have been carried out by this population (Haberfeld et al., 2009). The Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is the primary separatist terrorist organization which aims to establish an independent Kurdish state in Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey by utilizing violence. At the same time, the ultimate goal of the PKK was to expand this territory to include parts of northern Iraq, northern Syria and western Iran inhabited by Kurdish population, creating a “Greater Kurdistan” (Sozen, 2006). Moreover, in its “Foundation Statement”, the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered through Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Gergin et al., 2009). The so-called party program of the PKK also openly claimed that Kurdistan is divided by four colonizers, namely, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Yilmaz, 2011). As a result, the PKK and the so-called Kurdish problem have been an issue not only for Turkey, but also for Iraq, Iran, and Syria over time. This terrorist organization claims to advocate for the rights of Turkey’s Kurdish population. However, it is important to note that the PKK does not represent the view of the majority of the Kurdish population although it has gained popularity and found support among radical groups (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; Yilmaz, 2011).

It has been about 30 years since the PKK first launched its attacks against the Turkish government and civil targets. During this time period about 35,000 people have lost their lives in the terrorist campaign of the PKK (Yilmaz, 2011). The PKK has also been designated as a terrorist
organization by the US and the European Union. Over the years, the PKK goals seem to have changed from its initial plans to establish an independent Kurdish state to current ones of recognizing Kurdish political, social and cultural rights within a decentralised Turkey (Gunter, 2013). After periods of sporadic and relentless violence, Turkey’s increasing pressure led to the removal of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from his safe house in Syria in 1998 and subsequently he was arrested in Nairobi on February 15, 1999. Although there was a de-escalation in the PKK violence in the aftermath of Ocalan’s arrest, violence started again in the summer of 2004 and increased gradually. By 2012 there were more deaths due to PKK violence than at any time since the late 1990s (Gunter, 2013).

During the 30 years long of the PKK terrorist campaign, there were attempts to find a solution to the so-called Kurdish problem. In 2009, the Turkish government announced its decision to initiate a Kurdish opening or Kurdish initiative (Kurt acilimi) in order to address the country’s Kurdish question. However, this Kurdish opening failed due to several reasons such as the timing of the attempt, an apparent lack of an overall framework specifying how the discussion should develop, and a lack of specific proposals (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011; Gunter, 2013). Other reasons included a failure to marginalize the radical elements on the Kurdish side such as the PKK and a lack of consensus among the Turkish political parties (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011; Gunter, 2013). In 2013, the Turkish government restarted the Kurdish initiative and officials from the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) started meetings with prominent PKK leaders (Gunter, 2013).

However, despite the deescalating violence since 2013, it seems unclear how the peace process will progress. According to Gunter (2013, p. 94) “hopes for a successful conclusion of Turkey’s new Kurdish Opening appear tenuous for several reasons”. PKK proposals for local
autonomy and radical decentralization which would give its supporters and Ocalan (their leader) significant power are problematic and are not likely to be accepted by the Turkish state, a strongly centralized state since its foundation in 1923. On the other hand, complete disarmament of the PKK and the withdrawal of PKK militants from the Turkish territory seem to prove difficult as the PKK states that it should have a role in maintaining security in the southeastern part of Turkey (Gunter, 2013). As a result, there appear to be multiple issues to overcome before any permanent resolution can be reached regarding the Kurdish issue.

Religiously motivated terrorism and Al-Qaeda connected international terrorist groups have also been active in Turkey for the last three decades. Religiously motivated terrorist organizations favouring the establishment of an Islamic state began to emerge in Turkey following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 (Caglar, 2006). The most well-known religiously motivated terrorist groups in Turkey are; Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C (Islamic Great East Raiders-Front), ICCB-AFID (Anatolian Federal Islamic State), Tevhid-Selam (Kudus Ordusu-Quds Army) and Al-Qaeda. During their terrorist campaigns these terrorist organizations mainly targeted journalists, businessmen, intellectuals, security forces, Christian churches, publishing houses, secular TV transmitters and newspapers (Lefebvre, 2005; Cline, 2004). Among these terrorist organizations, the activities of Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C and ICCB-AFID were neutralized to a great extent. Successful police operations based on quality intelligence and government crackdown led to the arrests of a great number of members and supporters of these terrorist organizations (Cline, 2004).

On 15-20 November 2003, Turkey experienced Al-Qaeda connected international terrorism with the car bombing of two synagogues in Istanbul and the truck bombings of the HSBC Bank and the British Consulate leaving 62 people dead and over 650 injured. Some of the
perpetrators in these attacks had reportedly attended terrorist training in camps in Afghanistan. It also became apparent that the individuals who were involved in the bombings were Al-Qaeda linked extremists. Since then, Turkish police forces have carried out successful operations against Al-Qaeda inspired or affiliated individuals located in Turkey and multiple terrorist plots were thwarted before happening. However, elements of international terrorism continue to pose a threat and suggest continued security problems for Turkey, especially with the emergence of new organizations.

The Interior Ministry of Turkey is the key agency responding to these terrorist threats. Under the Turkish Ministry of Interior there are two major institutions responsible for counter-terrorism activities in Turkey: the Turkish National Police (TNP) and Turkish Gendarmerie forces. Counter-terrorism responsibilities are divided according to jurisdiction. TNP is responsible for the policing of urban areas and the Turkish Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining security and public order in rural areas of Turkey. In Turkey, there is also the National Intelligence Service (MIT-Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) that is responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on terrorism and threats to the national security of Turkey. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization combines the functions of both internal and external intelligence agencies. Collecting intelligence regarding terrorist activities is one of the top priorities of MIT. Other government institutions such as Turkish Armed Forces General Staff (Genelkurmay Baskanligi), Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK), Directorate General of Customs Enforcement (Gumrukler Muhafaza Genel Mudurlugu) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs also have roles and responsibilities in the field of national security and counter-terrorism. In the following section, I provide some additional information about the TNP, one of the targets of this research, in order to further familiarize the reader with its structure and counter-terrorism duties.
**Turkish National Police (TNP)**

The Turkish National Police (TNP) operates under the Ministry of Interior of Turkey. According to legislation and practices, the central and regional structure of the Turkish National Police force is defined as a law enforcement unit that operates within the network of the civil administration system and carries out its duties under the command and control of the civil authority (OSCE, 2015). TNP is mainly responsible for the policing of urban areas, such as cities and towns. The primary duties of the TNP are to maintain public order; to provide security of persons and properties; to detect, arrest and transfer both offenders and case evidence to the appropriate judicial bodies and to prevent crimes in order to protect public safety and order. Additionally, the Turkish National Police has counter-terrorism and national security related duties and responsibilities such as intelligence collection and analysis regarding terrorist activities, investigation of terrorist offences and the execution of tactical operations against terrorist organizations. These counter-terrorism functions are carried out by three separate departments within the TNP structure: the TNP Intelligence Department, the Counter-terrorism Department and the Special Operations Department. These departments are structured both at central and provincial levels. The central organizations at the Department level are within the Turkish National Police General Headquarters located in the capital, Ankara. Departments have also branch-level extensions in provinces and office-level extensions in districts (Turkish National Police, 2014).

According to a Turkish National Police Report (2014), the TNP Intelligence Department is focused on criminal and security intelligence gathering inside Turkey. The department is responsible for intelligence-gathering and analysis concerning terrorism, organized crime, and crimes against state security. The TNP Intelligence Department also disseminates intelligence collected to appropriate operational units within the TNP for further action such as judicial
investigations and tactical operations. Unlike the general policing duty of the TNP in urban areas of Turkey, the TNP Intelligence Department is authorized to collect intelligence throughout the country including both the urban and the rural areas. The TNP Intelligence Department is also engaged in international security cooperation activities against terrorism and intelligence sharing with partner police agencies through its International Relations Section (Personal experience).

The TNP Counter-terrorism Department is responsible for investigating terrorism-related offences under the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act. Counter-terrorism department units in the TNP investigate terror incidents, collect evidence, detain suspects and perform the judicial process regarding the terrorist offences (Turkish National Police, 2014). The TNP Counter-terrorism Department is also engaged in community outreach activities to prevent the radicalization of vulnerable youth and to prevent the recruitment activities of terrorist organizations (Turkish National Police, 2014).

The TNP Special Operations Department is a special counterterrorist unit which has a mandate to perform tactical operations against terrorist targets in urban and rural areas by using special weapons, equipment and tactics (Turkish National Police, 2014). The TNP Special Operations unit members sometimes take place in hostage rescue operations as well. Members of the TNP Special Operations Department are highly trained in using firearms, hostage-rescue techniques and high-risk arrest situations (Turkish National Police, 2014).

All these three departments of TNP work closely in carrying out their counter-terrorist functions. The counter-terrorist intelligence collected and analyzed by TNP Intelligence Department is disseminated to TNP Counter-terrorism Department for further action such as criminal investigation of terrorism cases and the arrest of terror suspects (Turkish National Police, 2014). In case of high-risk arrest situations and the possibility of armed clash between the police
and terrorists, TNP Special Operations Department units are deployed for engagement in the counter-terrorist operations. A continuous information sharing regarding terrorist threats takes place between these three departments in national and local levels.

The Turkish National Police is attaching great importance to international relations and cooperation with its foreign partners (Personal experience, Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011). Thus, the TNP is actively participating in international cooperation against terrorism. Within the scope of the Security Cooperation Agreements signed between Turkey and foreign countries, TNP is actively sharing intelligence regarding terrorism with its international partners, conducting joint investigative and operational activities against terrorists and terrorist organizations and providing counter-terrorism training to the police services of partner states (Personal experience, Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011). Within INTERPOL, TNP has also been one of the first and oldest INTERPOL members, having been part of Interpol since 1930 (INTERPOL, 2015).

The Turkish National Police have respect for human rights in the fulfillment of all its duties, in conformity with the principles of rule of law (OSCE, 2015). Thus, the TNP has increasingly placed importance on training and education of its members. The qualification of the police force has improved a great deal by raising the level of education and sending a large number of personnel abroad for training in different fields (OSCE, 2015). The TNP puts a great emphasis on the protection of human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law in performing its counter-terrorism functions as well (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The TNP has made a great progress in the prevention of violations of fundamental human rights in the enforcement of counter-terrorism measures (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). Haberfeld et al. (2009, p. 97) state that there is a strong recognition among the Turkish police officials that “terrorism has to be targeted in a non-
traditional way involving both law enforcement and the public”. The TNP have recognized the importance of prevention of the recruitment activities of terrorist organizations and the treatment of terrorist suspects within the framework of human rights in order to prevent the progression of potential sympathizers and passive supporters into active participation in terrorist activities (Haberfeld et al., 2009; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). This approach is extremely important in terms of proactive counter-terrorism and the prevention of terrorist recruitment, as it is already a well-established fact that terrorist organizations aim to create a perception among their target audience that the police is an instrument to deliver oppressive governmental policies in order to protect the existing regime and the state at the expense of human rights and civil liberties.

**Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Canada**

Canada, a liberal democracy and a multicultural nation with an enormous diversity of racial, ethnic and religious backgrounds, requires security in order to safeguard the way of life enjoyed by the people that live within its borders. In today’s world, external and internal threats to national security are multi-faceted and constantly evolving (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2015). Traditional security issues as well as new and evolving risks and threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organized crime and illegal immigration jeopardize the security of liberal democracies (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Canada is also affected by this changing security environment. Canada’s security interests are defined by its identity and geography (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009). In the aftermath of both World Wars and during the Cold War, Canada, like Turkey, remained a part of the Western Bloc. Kitchen and Sasikumar (2009) state that during the Cold War Canadian security interests were always defined not just in national terms, but also in terms of the security of the West as a whole.
Canada is a member of the longstanding UKUSA security agreement which was established in 1948 for signals intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation and information sharing between the partner states. This agreement also named ‘Five Eyes’ involves the US National Security Agency (NSA), UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) (Rudner, 2002, 2007). There are also some other more limited third parties (e.g. Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey) involved in global signals intelligence collection, processing and sharing (Rudner, 2002, 2007). The geographical position of Canada can be said to have provided it with some advantages in this longstanding SIGINT partnership. As Rudner (2002) states, Canada’s role in the UKUSA alliance was valued more for its unique geographic advantages. During the Cold War era, Canadian signals intelligence focused on communications across the northern Soviet Union and East Asia, and also the interception facilities of Canada targeted Latin American satellite relays (Rudner, 2002). In return, Canada was provided with connectivity to a world-wide capability to collect and deliver real-time communications interceptions on foreign targets, as well as access to the most sophisticated signals intelligence technologies (Rudner, 2007). These have a crucial role in global counter-terrorism efforts.

Canada’s geographical position and Canada’s longstanding Canada-US security relations are critical to understanding its security position. Having the longest non-militarized border in the world and being long-standing allies since the World War I, Canada and the United States have a long history of partnership on every imaginable issue. They are dependent on each other in security issues due to their shared border, however, beyond the geographical proximity, they have the same security/sovereignty concerns, crucial economic relations and shared cultural identity (Kitchen &
Sasikumar, 2009, Roach, 2012a). James (2012) argues that relations with the US tower above all others for Canada in terms of both importance and difficulty. In accordance with these uniquely close ties and shared interests, one can expect to see concurrence between Canadian and US policies. However, we note a reasonable amount of difference between US and Canadian policy choices on several issues including counter-terrorism (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009). There are differences in American and Canadian counter-terrorism which reflect each country’s history and legal systems (Roach, 2012a). A number of well-publicized counter-terrorism cases illustrate this point. For example, Maher Arar is a Syrian-born Canadian citizen who was detained by US authorities based on suspicions that he had links to Al-Qaeda. He was secretly extradited to Syria by US authorities where he was tortured and imprisoned for almost a year before returning to Canada. Subsequently, Arar was pardoned by a Canadian quasi-judicial public inquiry in 2006 and his civil claim for 10.5 million dollars was awarded by the Canadian government. However, despite all the efforts of Canadian officials, Arar continued to remain on American watch-lists and his civil claim against the US officials was rejected by the American judiciary (Roach, 2012a).

This case is an example of the distinctions between Canadian and American responses to counter-terrorism. In their counter-terrorism approaches, Canada has been more concerned about the violation of human/individual rights and generally prioritized rights over security by virtue of independent Canadian courts and quasi-judicial public inquiries that have played a vigorous role in auditing counter-terrorism actions by the officials. The US, on the other hand, has seen terrorism as an external threat requiring a military response and has used military detention and commissions as a way to deal with terrorists (Roach, 2012a).

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3 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006)
An important factor in shaping the counter-terrorism policy in Canada is the national identity. Kitchen and Sasikumar (2009) argue that the way a country defines itself influences its threat perception and responses. Some parts of Canadian identity are shared with US Americans, however, at some points Canadians differentiate themselves from Americans. This differentiation influences Canadian security and foreign policy as well and makes Canada sometimes have different views or interests than the US. This sometimes results in differences between Canadian and American counter-terrorism policies (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009).

Sovereignty and economic concerns are also important determinants in Canadian-American security relations. In this respect, the events of 9/11 are a good illustration of the sovereignty concerns and economic issues within Canadian counter-terrorism policies. Canada, as a member of the Western alliance and a close partner of the US, reacted strongly to the 9/11 attacks by taking some important steps such as enacting the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act 2001, increasing its security budget and supporting the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. However, Canada’s response to the 9/11 attacks should also be analyzed in terms of sovereignty and economic concerns. For example, keeping the border with the US open to avoid enormous economic losses (which would follow from any sustained closing of the border) was the other important determinant of Canada’s response to 9/11. This was in addition to ensuring that the US response to 9/11 did not have a negative impact on the security and sovereignty of Canada. In his book Canada and Conflict, James (2012) states the following issues regarding Canadian response to 9/11:

Canada’s response to 9/11, in the specific context of continental security, can be seen in terms of protecting sovereignty. While Canada joined forces with the US against terrorism, it also did so with caution and attention to the desire to balance security needs against
potential problems arising with respect to civil rights. Thus Canada attempted to preserve its sovereignty by taking measures necessary to ensure the US of its commitment to security but staying away, to the extent possible, from any homogenizing effects arising from the fear and anxiety in place after 9/11. (p. 84)

In summary, it can be inferred that despite uniquely close ties and shared economic and security interests between Canada and the United States, there have also been disagreements between the two neighbours in counter-terrorism matters. Moreover, while these disagreements have not predominantly been between the Canadian and American governments which share common security and economic interests, they mostly have been between the Canadian judiciary that has been more concerned about the violation and the neglect of human rights and the US legal system that has deferred to the executive and the military on counter-terrorism issues (Roach, 2012a). Canada and the United States governments, however, continue working together closely in the fight against terrorism. The most recent Perimeter Security Action Plan\textsuperscript{4} signed in 2011 between Canada and the US governments can be regarded as proof of this ongoing cooperation in security matters. This action plan encourages the intensification of law enforcement intelligence sharing between Canadian and the US agencies in order to further strategic interests in identifying and addressing threats early. The action plan also promotes cooperative investigation and prosecution efforts and transnational criminal investigations and the development of integrated cross-border law enforcement operations. Although there appear to be reasons for concern about the protection of individual rights on the Canadian side and about security on the American side, it is likely that Canada and the United States will continue cooperating closely on counter-terrorism related matters in the future.

\textsuperscript{4} Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness
In an increasingly globalized world, terrorism is a global issue and Canada is not immune to terrorism. As stated in the Government of Canada’s national counter-terrorism strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, terrorism is a serious and persistent threat to the security of Canada and its citizens (Public Safety Canada, 2013). Twenty-four Canadians were killed in 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, this was not Canada’s first experience with terrorism. Prior to 9/11, Canada was influenced by both domestic and international terrorism (Roach, 2011). At the same time, Canada, known for its stance as a peacekeeper country in the international society, has been targeted by a small number of foreign terrorist groups (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015).

Canada suffered from separatist terrorist actions of the FLQ group that was particularly active from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Between 1963 and 1968, FLQ espoused traditional right-wing nationalism and its main demand was the independence of Quebec (Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, 2008). Whereas after 1968 it also aimed to emancipate the working class in addition to its traditional goal of the independence of Quebec (Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, 2008). After a series of attacks and bombings against different targets including government and civil targets, during what is known today as October Crisis of 1970, members of the FLQ kidnapped a Quebec politician and a British diplomat. As a result, the Canadian government declared Martial Law under the *War Measures Act* and deployed troops into Montreal (Roach, 2012a).

During the October Crisis, civil rights were suspended, almost 500 people were taken into custody on the charges of being a member or supporter of an unlawful organization and several of them were detained without judicial review or access to legal counsel. Roach (2012a) states that the October crisis of 1970 and the accompanying undemocratic practices have had a longstanding effect on Canadian counter-terrorism policy. It fostered the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the removal of national security intelligence collection duty from RCMP
(Roach, 2012a). This resulted because of the illegal activities of the RCMP in the wake of the crisis. Security intelligence collection function was subsequently assigned to the newly established Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) which is a civilian security intelligence agency without law enforcement powers and subject to extensive review by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) (Charters, 2008).

Canada has also suffered from international terrorism including an incident in 1985. In 1985, Sikh separatists were responsible for the most lethal act of aviation terrorism before 9/11. The bombing of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985 on its way from Vancouver to New Delhi resulted in the killing of 329 passengers of whom 280 were Canadian citizens. Two men alleged to have been involved in the perpetration of the attack were subsequently acquitted in 2005. A public inquiry\(^5\) into the Air India bombing subsequently revealed the intelligence failures at the time of the attack. This public inquiry also documented how the post-bombing investigation of the incident was impaired by a lack of cooperation between CSIS and the RCMP, the routine destruction of the wiretaps by the CSIS on the alleged mastermind of the Air India bombing plot, and the poor handling and protection of witnesses (Roach, 2011, 2012a). Based on Canada’s response to Air India bombing, it can be argued that whereas Canada overreacted to the October Crisis of 1970, its response both before and after the Air India bombing can be interpreted as a number of critical failures that happened amongst Canada’s intelligence agencies.

As of today, terrorism continues to remain the leading threat to the national security of Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2014). Canadians are increasingly concerned that some young Canadian citizens have been recruited for terrorist movements abroad, including Somalia, Syria, and now Iraq. According to official reports, as of early 2014, there were more than 130 individuals

with Canadian connections who were abroad and who were suspected of taking part in terrorism-related activities (Public Safety Canada, 2014). These Canadian extremist travellers participated in active combat as well as other terrorism-related activities such as collecting money for terrorist purposes, propaganda, training and providing other kinds of support to terrorist organizations. These individuals could perpetrate terrorist attacks once they return to Canada. In order to address the threat of extremist travellers, the Canadian government enacted *The Combatting Terrorism Act* in July 2013. This act created four new offences intended to prevent and deter people from leaving Canada for terrorism-related purposes (Public Safety Canada, 2014).

Canada’s security is also threatened by the increasing risk of homegrown terrorism and violent extremists acting in small cells or as individuals who are often inspired by Al-Qaeda’s violent ideology. The arrest of eighteen Canadians in Toronto in 2006 for allegedly planning to kill fellow citizens is just one example of the growing threat of homegrown terrorism (Wilner, 2008). In April 2013, the RCMP arrested two people who were charged with plotting to attack a VIA Rail train travelling between New York and Toronto. The recent terrorist attacks in Ottawa and Quebec suggest that homegrown terrorism continues to threaten Canada. The Canadian government has recently introduced new legislation called Bill C-51 in order to expand powers for Canada’s police and intelligence agencies to combat domestic extremism and prevent potential terrorist attacks (Payton, 2015). Moreover, Canada’s deployment of fighter jets for the US-led combat mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organization may also encourage some terrorist groups to target Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests in the foreseeable future.

Major Canadian agencies that have roles and responsibilities in responding to terrorism are Public Safety Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS). There are also other government actors involved in protecting Canada’s national security such as Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), and Department of Justice. However, these three agencies are the main actors that are primarily responsible for counter-terrorism and national security of Canada. Within the scope of this study, the primary focus will be on RCMP’s role in counter-terrorism structure of the Government of Canada and the counter-terrorism measures implemented by the RCMP. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, I will provide some background information about the RCMP and its national security and counter-terrorism mandate.

**The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)**

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is Canada’s national police force that was established in 1873. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a national, federal, provincial and municipal policing body and provides a total federal policing service to all Canadians and policing services under contract to the three territories, eight provinces (except Ontario and Quebec), more than 150 municipalities, more than 600 Aboriginal communities and three international airports (RCMP, 2015). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police was under the Department of Justice until it was transferred to Public Safety Canada when that department was created in 2003 (Deflem, 2010). At the federal level, the RCMP is mainly responsible for drug enforcement, immigration and passport investigations, investigation of commercial crimes and organized crime and national security policing.

Terrorism is one of the strategic priorities of the RCMP. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has a dual role in combatting threats to the national security of Canada. Under the Security Offences Act, the RCMP has primary responsibility for the investigation, prevention and prosecution of criminal activities related to national security (O’Connor, 2006). Also, it has a
criminal intelligence role that supports those national security and terrorism investigations and its protective policing mandate (Hanniman, 2007; O’Connor, 2006). Accordingly, Hanniman (2007) states that the RCMP has adopted an intelligence-led policing model for use in counter-terrorism investigations. Canadian Anti-terrorism Act also spells out the RCMP’s role in national security. It also facilitates the investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities by accurately stating the types of activity falling within the range of interest of RCMP and other police forces in Canada (Hanniman, 2007). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is also responsible for investigating terrorism-related offences under several acts such as the Security of Information Act, the Security Offences Act, as well as any other criminal offence under the Criminal Code of Canada. National security-related mandates and responsibilities of the RCMP include national security criminal investigations, protective policing, border integrity, critical infrastructure protection, marine security, air carrier protection, critical incident management and a host of related support services (RCMP, 2015).

Outreach/awareness at all levels of policing with communities and partners, prevention, strategic analysis, information/intelligence sharing, and enforcement are the basic tenets of the multifaceted approach of RCMP in counter-terrorism and national security policing (RCMP, 2015). Conducting criminal investigations into national security-related, terrorist and criminal activity is the basis of the RCMP’s national security activities. Accordingly, RCMP maintains a nation-wide integrated National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) program. National Security Criminal Investigations program aims to reduce the threat of terrorist criminal activity in Canada and abroad by preventing, detecting, investigating, and gathering evidence to support the prosecution of those involved in national security-related criminal acts (RCMP, 2015).
As part of the NSCI program, the RCMP also has Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) based in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa and National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs) in every other province (RCMP, 2015). INSETs are made up of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners and agencies and provincial and municipal police services, whereas NSESs are solely composed of RCMP employees. The RCMP headquarters National Security Criminal Investigations Directorate is responsible for overseeing the INSETs and NSESs (Hanniman, 2007). INSETs collect, share and analyze information and intelligence about criminal threats to national security and criminal extremism/terrorism. NSES members conduct national security criminal investigations and provide specialized expertise for the RCMP's national security-related responsibilities (RCMP, 2015). These teams play a critical role in national security criminal investigations by enhancing RCMP's capacity to collect, share, and analyze intelligence to lead effective law enforcement actions in preventing terrorist activity. Additionally, the benefit of this integrated policing approach is to leverage the resources and mandates of multiple law enforcement agencies and other federal/provincial and municipal partners to achieve shared strategic and tactical objectives (RCMP, 2015). INSETs and NSESs work in collaboration with both domestic and foreign partners in their investigations into terrorist activities.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is also committed to working in partnership with domestic partners at the federal and provincial level and private sector stakeholders to enhance prevention measures against the threat of terrorism towards critical infrastructure. As part of its mandate, the RCMP has developed the Suspicious Incident Reporting system to gather information from industry and law enforcement about suspicious incidents that may have a nexus to national security (RCMP, 2015). Another issue that the RCMP attach importance to is its efforts to counter
the threat of terrorism through engagement with local communities. In this context, the National Security Community Outreach program was created in order to engage the communities most impacted by RCMP national security criminal investigations (RCMP, 2015). Hanniman (2008) argues that the creation of the RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach Program aimed to involve the diverse communities of Canada in the protection of Canada’s national security by employing community policing principles. Members of different ethnic, racial and religious communities would feel that they belong to Canadian society and work all together for the same purpose which is the protection of Canada and its people. Through the National Security Community Outreach program, the RCMP also aimed to counter violent extremism and radicalization leading to violence by addressing potential political violence and identifying and addressing the concerns of minority communities (Public Safety Canada, 2013).

Summary

This chapter has reviewed the history and geopolitics of Turkey and Canada. It has also looked at the terrorism and counter-terrorism experiences of both countries and the key organizations that perform counter-terrorism functions in those countries. The chapter has illustrated that Turkey has an older counter-terrorism strategy than Canada, and sits in a strategic position vis a vis the Caucasus, Europe and Middle East. Turkey has been struggling with terrorism and political violence since the beginning of 1960s and Turkish law enforcement has considerable experience in dealing with different types of terrorist cases. On the other hand, while Canada has a more recent history of terrorism, it has a unique position because of its relationship with the U.S. and it is not entirely unfamiliar with terrorist activities. Though Canada has not experienced the same scale of terrorist violence as Turkey, Canada has experienced separatist, international and homegrown terrorism over time. While both countries are the targets of terrorist attacks by Al-
Qaeda inspired jihadist groups, Turkey faces a more significant threat from separatist/ethno-nationalist and religious terrorism.

There are also similarities and differences in the major counter-terrorism agencies of both countries. There is a more centralised counter-terrorism structure in Canada as compared to Turkey. While the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in Canada ensures coordination across key federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and counter-terrorism, there is not a dedicated department or ministry in the administrative structure of Turkey which is tasked with the coordination of agencies involved in counter-terrorism functions. At the same time, both Turkey and Canada have a national police agency and these national police services are the lead agencies in preventing and responding to terrorism in both countries. In Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP) is the primary agency responsible for prevention and criminal investigation of terrorist offences, whereas in Canada the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has the primary responsibility for national security law enforcement.

In regard to the intelligence structure of the two countries, Turkey has a national intelligence service (MIT-Turkish National Intelligence Organization) which is authorized both at home and abroad to collect intelligence regarding national security. In this manner, MIT combines the functions of both domestic and foreign intelligence agencies. On the other hand, Canada has no dedicated foreign intelligence service (like the CIA) with jurisdiction outside the country although Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) collects and analyzes security intelligence from across the country and abroad.

Before proceeding with the comparative analysis of the counter-terrorism measures and strategies of the TNP and RCMP, I will outline the proposed methodology for the thesis in the following chapter.
Chapter IV
Methodology

Research Design

A research design refers to a flexible set of guidelines that connects theoretical paradigms to strategies of inquiry and methods for collecting empirical material (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 14) state that “a research design situates researchers in the empirical world and connects them to specific sites, people, groups, institutions, and bodies of relevant interpretive material, including documents and archives”. To investigate Turkish and Canadian police organizations’ response to terrorism, this research used a qualitative comparative (multiple) case study approach.

Given the nature of this study and the nature of terrorism studies in general, a qualitative research design seemed well-suited. Detailed qualitative accounts might offer a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the particular phenomenon being studied, which may not be identified through using quantitative, experimental or survey researches. This qualitative case study aims to provide rich and detailed descriptions through analyzing official and non-official documents concerning the cases. In this regard, this study will take an interpretive approach rather than a positivist approach in analyzing the cases. The researcher seeks to discover the meaning of the events from a law enforcement perspective rather than to test theories and causal relationships between variables.

Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 301) defines the case study as “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) offer a broad definition of the case study approach as the following:
Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a “real life” context. It is research-based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence-led. The primary purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic…, programme, policy, institution or system to generate knowledge and/or to inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community action. (p. 256)

Case studies have long been used for conducting research in education, child and youth development, international affairs, public policy and in business and public administration (Yin, 2003). Case studies can be conducted qualitatively, quantitatively, analytically or hermeneutically, or by using mixed methods (Flyvbjerg, 2011). According to Berg (2004, p. 251), “case study methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions”. Case studies may employ a number of data-gathering techniques such as life histories, ethnography, document analysis, interviews, and participant observation. Berg (2004) states that extremely rich, detailed, and in-depth information characterize the type of information collected in a case study.

In terms of case study design type, this study can be categorized as an exploratory and instrumental case study. In an instrumental case study, a case is studied to provide insight into a larger topic or to revise a generalization (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). In this research, the choice of instrumental case study is made because it is expected to advance our understanding of some other research interest. The case itself serves a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else (Berg, 2004). This case study aims to facilitate our understanding of police responses to terrorism. On the other hand, this research is an example of a comparative case study
which can be described as “a set of multiple case studies of multiple research entities for the purpose of cross-unit comparison” (Berg, 2004, p. 258). A purpose of this research is to compare the counter-terrorism strategies and measures of the Turkish and Canadian police organizations.

**Research Questions**

This thesis attempts to explore the following research questions. These questions are examined with a comparative, case study methodology. These are:

- Following large scale terrorist attacks and incidents around the world and the ever-changing nature of terrorism, what are the main strategies and objectives which international police agencies pursue in preventing and responding to terrorism?
- What similarities and differences emerge between the counter-terrorism responses of the police organizations in different parts of the world, in particular between western and non-western countries?
- What are the main unique characteristics of counter-terrorism responses of each the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and what are their differences and similarities?
- Which theoretical model of counter-terrorism dominates the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) response to terrorism?

**Data Collection**

Data for this research mainly relies on a comprehensive review of the literature and the consulting of official and non-official documents. One method of data collection employed in this study is archival research that can be defined as “the locating, evaluating, and systematic interpretation and analysis of sources found in archives” (Corti, 2004, p. 21). Fitzgerald and Cox (2002, p. 127) define archival research as “research based upon analysis of existing sources of
information”. Archival data may include public documents and official records (such as government papers or reports), organizational records, medical records, personal collections, written or taped records of speeches, photographs, newspapers, books, secondary data archives and other contextual materials (Corti, 2004; Palys & Atchison, 2008). Archival research can be classified as one of the unobtrusive or non-reactive data collection techniques in social science research (Fitzgerald & Cox, 2002; Palys & Atchison, 2008). In the archival research, available data may be consulted and analyzed for purposes other than those for which they were originally produced (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Corti (2004, p. 21) notes that archival research can be used to “ask new questions of old data, provide a comparison over time or between geographic areas, verify or challenge existing findings, or draw together evidence from disparate sources to provide a bigger picture”.

Archival measures can be utilized rather effectively to conduct research, especially when used in conjunction with other techniques of data collection (Corti, 2004). Corti (2004, p. 21) notes that “consulting archival sources enables the social scientist to both enhance and challenge the established methods of defining and collecting data”. Studying archival materials provides the researcher with numerous advantages. Archival research is often the only way of collecting data regarding past events, conducting such research is relatively inexpensive, and as with other unobtrusive measures, archival data are generally less influenced by reactivity than interactive techniques (Fitzgerald & Cox, 2002; Palys & Atchison, 2008). Studying archival materials also allows the researcher to go back to a given document or archive over and over to subject it to greater or different examination (Palys & Atchison, 2008). The researcher consulted and reviewed as many print and electronic documents as possible in order to gain the insight about the terrorism and counter-terrorism experience of Turkish and Canadian police organizations.
Turkish, Canadian and American academic literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism including academic books and journal articles written by inside and outside counter-terrorism experts provided considerable data for this study. Academic journal articles and books provided objective and comprehensive knowledge regarding the phenomenon of terrorism and Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism practices. For example, terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw’s articles which were selected for this thesis provided substantial knowledge on instrumental and organizational explanations of terrorism. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (2013) written by famous terrorism and counter-terrorism scholar Alex P. Schmid, was a widely cited source used in this research. In terms of Turkish counter-terrorism experience, this thesis usually benefited from the academic articles written by TNP counter-terrorism experts. Another major source of data for Turkish counter-terrorism experience was the NATO Science for Peace and Security Series books that published many articles by Turkish scholars. The researcher got substantial data about Turkish law enforcement response to terrorism from academic sources. Academic journal articles published by Canadian scholars provided detailed insight about Canadian counter-terrorism responses. Among these were Jacoby’s (2004) study on Canadian democracy and the campaign against global terrorism, Kitchen and Sasikumar’s (2009) article on US-Canada relations and counter-terrorism policy, Roach’s (2006, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) comparative research on Canadian responses to terrorism before and after 9/11, and comparison of American and Canadian counter-terrorism policies, Rudner’s (2002, 2004, 2007) research on Canadian intelligence community. These academic sources were easily accessible from the university library and provided substantial unclassified data about both Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism responses.
Another source of data used in this research include official documents published on terrorism issues such as government reports and police training catalogues. The researcher greatly benefited from the official reports published by the Canadian government agencies such as the Public Safety Canada’s reports on terrorist threats to Canada and the annual public report of the CSIS. Another example of government reports cited in this research is *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy* (2013) published by Public Safety Canada. Official documents were particularly useful in understanding the Canadian response to terrorism. In terms of Turkish case, the researcher made use of TNP’s official documents such as the international training catalogue of TNP Training Department. Despite the fact that reports by governments and agencies that deal with terrorism may have a political agenda, official documents provided considerable amount of data for this thesis. This included data on current terrorism threats, the roles and responsibilities of counter-terrorism agencies, and the fundamental principles underpinning the counter-terrorism strategies of each country.

Another source of data consulted in this thesis are the reports of think tank organisations which are engaged in terrorism and security research. These think tank organizations include Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Brookings Institute for Strategic Dialogue, UTSAM (Turkish National Police Academy International Research Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime), Canadian International Council (CIC) and Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). A reason for including think tank reports in this research is that much well-informed research on terrorism and counter-terrorism has often been conducted by trusted researchers with security clearances at think tanks (Schmid, 2013a). Edwards, Jeffray, and Pantucci’s (2015) report on the role of community policing in preventing terrorism in Canada is one example of the think tank reports employed in this research.
Open source data was also consulted in this thesis. Open sources such as official websites of the Turkish National Police (TNP), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other related government institutions (such as the Public Safety Canada, CSIS, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.) and the other publicly available documents such as newspaper articles were consulted in this research. Open source data was included because it is publicly available and conveniently accessible. Open sources such as official websites of the TNP and the RCMP provided detailed information on the counter-terrorism structures and responsibilities of these organizations. Websites of the national newspapers included data on the current terrorism and counter-terrorism developments in each country.

The researcher also has benefited from classified information in his analysis regarding the Turkish case. The researcher’s professional experience and personal acquaintance with counter-terrorism staff in Turkey allowed him to gain access to classified information. Adana Police Department’s booklet entitled “Individual centered procedural approach model in counter terrorism” (2013) provided considerable amount of knowledge regarding TNP’s preventive responses to terrorism. However, as stated above, a significant portion of the data for this study came from unclassified and public sources.

Doing research on terrorism and counter-terrorism differs from standard social science research and offers a number of difficulties and challenges (Schmid, 2013a). Since the researchers are dealing with terrorist organizations and/or counter-terrorism structures, even basic data are often not accessible in the public domain. According to Robert Asprey (as cited in Schmid, 2013a), terrorism is often a “war in the shadows”, despite the significant publicity it often generates. Data regarding most failed and foiled terrorist attacks, terrorist methods or counter-terrorism work do not often make it into public domain or academia. Therefore, “disinformation and distortions from
both terrorists and their opponents are an additional problem for those working exclusively with open sources” (Schmid, 2013a, p. 461). Also, because of the dangers of doing research in conflict zones with high levels of terrorism, many researchers have often conducted their studies based on media news stories or government reports—both often not very reliable sources (Schmid, 2013a). Access to classified information and acquiring security clearances have been significant obstacles for terrorism researchers.

The research approval process for most security institutions is long and access to security officials is limited (Kitchen, 2014). As a result, much well-informed research on terrorism and counter-terrorism has often been conducted by trusted researchers with security clearances at think tanks or government agencies themselves (Schmid, 2013a). However, it is not impossible to do good research without access to classified information. There is an abundance of credible open sources including government and investigatory commissions’ reports, journalistic investigations on leaks of classified information, testimonies, terrorist accounts on the media, memoires, books by counter-terrorism experts, journalistic books on individual terrorist life, and ethnographic studies which include the terrorist accounts of the events. Nevertheless, given the fact that terrorism is subjective and politicised, it should be kept in mind that reports by governments and agencies that deal with terrorism may have a political agenda. Their vision on terrorism might be different from ours. We have to be aware of the fact that there is a political agenda behind it. That has of course an impact on the usability of these kinds of reports. In other words, these public documents reflect how each government wishes to frame, or project, its counter-terrorist agenda to the public.

Another method of data collection and interpretation in this research was the researcher’s career as a police professional. The researcher’s practical, real-world experience in counter-
terrorism and professional observations within the scope of his appointment in Turkish National Police (TNP) Intelligence Department provided knowledge for this thesis. This duty provided the researcher with the opportunity of first-hand view of TNP’s counter-terrorism policing activities and strategies. In that capacity, and within the parlance of qualitative methodology, the author was an “observant participant.” Observant participation has limitations. According to Ö zgüler (2008), first, a police professional is surrounded by bureaucratic boundaries which confine his/her role as a researcher whose interest focuses on a wide range of organizational knowledge. Second, a police professional is entirely enmeshed in his/her career (Ö zgüler, 2008). While such involvement has the advantage of offering a first-hand view of incidents, “enmeshment socializes a police professional to fit the mold cast by police organizational culture” (Ö zgüler, 2008, p. 58). A contradiction or clash between the role of an observant participant and the worldview of a police professional can make things difficult. In this case, an observant participant and police professional must consciously learn to distinguish his/her perspectives as an observant participant from those of a police professional (Ö zgüler, 2008). This conflict between the role of researcher and occupational professional has been specifically described in ethnographic literature (Fleisher, 1998). However, it should be noted, that in this particular case, the participant observer, is both a police officer and a trained academic, a role that is rather unique in regard to these types of studies.

**Analyzing the Data**

This thesis will analyze the counter-terrorism activities of the TNP and the RCMP in a comparative context. This analysis of the policing of terrorism in Turkey and Canada will be based on the three-model typology offered by Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001). Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) proposed a theoretical model of counter-terrorism in which they elaborated on the operational aspects of the War Model and Criminal Justice Model in countering terrorism and
presented a tertiary model named Expanded Criminal Justice Model which aims to mediate between the war and criminal justice models in the so-called gray areas. The following paragraphs will elaborate on these underlying theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism which shape police strategies and responses to terrorism.

**Theoretical Models of Policing for Counter-Terrorism**

There are different theoretical models for combatting terrorism. These existing models which are either “soft” or “hard” in their approach and consequences provide us with a way of thinking about the underlying philosophies and strategies that provide a rationale for counter-terrorism (Greene & Herzog, 2009). These models basically accentuate the differences in approaching the problems in terrorism from a military versus a justice system perspective (Greene & Herzog, 2009). In fact, whether terrorism should be regarded as crime or war has been a widely debated issue among scholars. There has been significant discussion on whether terrorism should be addressed as a criminal justice issue or a military problem (Rosenfeld, 2004). This debate has also had its influence on the concept of counter-terrorism policing. Some scholars argue that terrorism is criminal in nature although it is generally characterized as different from ordinary types of crime (Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007; Klinger & Heal, 2011). They note that all terrorist acts are eventually local, especially in terms of their impacts. They argue that due to the involvement of violence in terrorist acts and the violation of laws by the violence involved, the overlap between crime and terrorism is obvious (Klinger & Heal, 2011). Terrorists predominantly use violence to achieve their goals and the violence employed by terrorists constitutes a violation of physical integrity and rights to live of individuals which is also prohibited by criminal law. Therefore, they argue that terrorism should be perceived as a form of criminal act and propose a response using the traditional law enforcement system (Perliger, 2012). On the other
hand, there are also perspectives claiming that counter-terrorism is not just a simple law
enforcement matter (Deflem, 2010). According to these perspectives, terrorism is not simply a
form of crime but rather an act of war that challenges political systems or the sovereignty of nation
states, suggesting the use of military means (Perliger, 2012).

In regards to discussion on whether terrorism can be considered as a type of crime or war,
scholars have different views on the subject. Vila and Savage (2011) argue that the war on terror,
like wars on crime and drugs, is likely to fail because the war metaphor is not compatible with
not absolute warfare because it is unilateral and covert rather than bilateral and overt, and it targets
ordinary civilians rather than military installations or personnel. Instead, Black (2004) sees
terrorism as a form of *quasi-warfare*. Rosenfeld (2004), at this point, argues that a more precise
term which can be employed instead of *quasi-warfare* can be “criminal warfare”. He mentions
two types of violence (moralistic and predatory violence) which terrorism employs, and notes that
“terrorism is the nexus of warlike aims and criminal (i.e. predatory) means” (Rosenfeld, 2004, p.
22). He points out this situation as the reason for ramifications and conflict over whether terrorism
should be regarded as a criminal justice or military problem, as crime or war, because it is both
(Rosenfeld, 2004).

Jaggar (2005, p. 209) argues that “Paradigmatically, war is open armed conflict between the
official military forces of recognized states or (in the case of civil war) between government forces
and those who wish to seize state power”. By suggesting that terrorism is a tactic which may or
may not be used in wartime and may also be used outside situations of declared war (Jaggar, 2005),
she makes a clear distinction between war and terrorism. At this point, Vila and Savage (2011, p.
who argue that terrorism is a tactic, suggest that “one does not war against tactics-one counters them”.

After 9/11, there has been considerable debate regarding whether terrorism is a crime or not, especially in the US and other Western countries. This debate was both influenced by and impacted country responses to terrorism. Post 9/11 American approaches to counter-terrorism that widely employ military for responding to terrorism, American use of military tribunals to charge foreign terrorist suspects have been intensely discussed by academicians and policy makers in West (Roach, 2012a). This is also becoming a growing issue in Canada with the passing of Bill C-51. Although Canadians have instinctively seen terrorism as a crime, Bill C-51 provokes growing debates among Canadian scholars and policy makers on whether terrorism should be dealt with as any other criminal offense or by using military and intelligence methods (Roach, 2012a).

Based on this discussion, three models of policing for counter-terrorism emerged, the War, Criminal Justice and Widened Criminal Justice Models. These models define and shape police strategies, actions and responses regarding counter-terrorism and “are rooted in considerations of the police role in a democratic society, the rule of law, and the need for extraordinary measures that may be necessary to effectively address terrorism” (Greene & Herzog, 2009, p. 145). The following further explicates these three underlying models for counter-terrorism policing.

**The war model.** The War Model defines terrorism as an act of war that challenges political systems or the sovereignty of nation states. This model suggests that terrorism must be fought aggressively by using military forces and civilian intelligence agencies (Perliger et al., 2009). Advocates of the war model argue that counter-terrorism is not just a simple law enforcement matter. They claim that “we are at war, our enemies in this war are not common criminals, and therefore we should fight them using military and intelligence methods” (Kris, 2011, pp. 5-6).
What is primarily aimed with the use of this model in counter-terrorism activities is the apprehension of terrorists and the total elimination of terrorism (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). According to Dunlap (1999) the adoption of the war model brings together an increasing "police-ization" of the military which means armed forces performing tasks that are essentially law enforcement in nature. Longstanding British military presence in Northern Ireland, and the Israeli military and police presence in the Palestinian territories demonstrate the War Model in operation (Greene & Herzog, 2009).

Critics of the War Model argue that this approach infringes on the basic liberal-democratic principles and will lead the country significantly away from acceptable democratic standards (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). They also argue that militarized strategies for counter-terrorism can be very efficient in the targeting and elimination of terrorists; however, military action does not address the underlying causes of terrorism and does not provide proactive means to address terrorism (Lieberman, 2009). Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq after US intervention in the name of counter-terrorism, and continuing attacks and conflicts in those countries and elsewhere, are indicative of the ineffectiveness of a ‘war on terror’ paradigm. Consequently, the primary challenge in applying the War Model is the need to develop ways of applying counter-terrorist means successfully, while at the same time abstaining from damaging civil and human rights (Greene & Herzog, 2009).

The criminal justice model. Proponents of the Criminal Justice Model argue that terrorism is a form of crime and a violation of existing national and international criminal laws. According to this view, terrorism is geopolitical, but it is also a crime in the jurisdictions in which it occurs (Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011). Based on this perspective, terrorism should be dealt with as any other criminal offense by using criminal justice and law enforcement measures. In this model of
response to terrorism, it is the police who are primarily responsible for countering terrorism and exercising the state’s monopoly on the use of violence. Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 147) state that “this perspective does not attribute relevance to the motive behind the violent act or to instrumental objectives, but to the act itself”.

In the Criminal Justice Model, protection of democratic principles is a fundamental assumption in the fight against terrorism, even at the expense of a reduced effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). Proponents of the Criminal Justice Model argue that the distinction between terrorism and ordinary types of crime can eventually encourage overreliance on punitive and harsh measures in counter-terrorism (Vila & Savage, 2011). Overexaggeration of the terrorist threat and a state of emergency trigger the application of extraordinary counter-terrorism measures and policies which are generally strict, coercive and intimidating. According to this view, separation of terrorism and crime can also weaken efforts of investigation and prevention, as well as the effectiveness of government responses (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007). Therefore, according to the advocates of this model, the criminal nature of terrorism should be addressed for the development of effective counter-terrorism strategies legislated into policy of police practices.

**The widened criminal justice model.** The growing strength, complexity, and persistence of terrorist attacks in the democratic countries have resulted in the amalgamation of components from the War and Criminal Justice Models (Greene & Herzog, 2009). Particularly, during times of an impending threat or crisis, the limits of the Criminal Justice Model tend to be expanded by policy makers in liberal democratic states (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). This elasticity of the Criminal Justice Model brings together the encroachment of the military into the jurisdiction of police authority and vice versa (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). In this case, the police adapt to use
the means to counter-terrorism which normally deviate from traditional law enforcement practices. As a result, “because of these aberrations of the ‘criminal justice’ model, liberal democracies attempting to exercise counter-terrorist strategies will tend to deviate from the ‘rule of law’ and democratic standards” (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001, p. 4). The Expanded Criminal Justice Model has emerged due to the need for the clarification of the boundaries between the War and Criminal Justice Models.

According to Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001), the Expanded Criminal Justice Model acknowledges the fact that the war against terror may often stray from liberal standards and employ means not necessarily accepted as principles of criminal law enforcement, but at the same time still significantly differs from the rules of war and customary military methods. In this model, terrorism is seen as an exceptional phenomenon which is not necessarily an act of war but also not defined as a malicious criminal act. As the ‘expanded criminal justice’ model regards terrorism as an exceptional phenomenon, despite the desire to adhere as much as possible to the ‘rule of law’, legal boundaries are expanded in order to facilitate a more effective response to terrorism while partially abandoning certain liberal principles and in general abusing freedom of expression and action (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). After all, as opposed to the ‘war’ model, the tools employed within the framework of the Widened Criminal Justice Model are not enough to completely violate the democratic boundaries.

Within the context of the Widened Criminal Justice Model, the main bodies which are tasked with responding to terrorism are the police, intelligence services and special anti-terrorism units. Policing responses to terrorism within the scope of this model are; creating specialized anti-terrorism and intelligence units, preventive arrests, surveillance and intelligence gathering, incorporating terrorism issues into police training, expanding the use of protection devices and
technology designated to confront exceptional violence, increasing cooperation between police and intelligence bodies, and recruiting personnel with appropriate skills from the military (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The ultimate aim of the counter-terrorism activities executed within the scope of this model is to bring the terrorism suspects in front of the justice for trial.

Summary

In this thesis, the nature of counter-terrorism policing activities carried out by the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) will be compared and contrasted by using a qualitative comparative (multiple) case study approach based on written document analysis. This analysis will utilize the three-model typology offered by Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) regarding the theoretical models of counter-terrorism. This case study’s units of analysis are the Turkish and Canadian national police organizations. By comparatively and critically examining the cases at hand, this research will attempt to further our knowledge regarding the strategies and objectives which international police agencies pursue in preventing and responding to terrorism.

The balance of this thesis attempts to compare the counter-terrorism measures and strategies of the TNP and RCMP. In the next chapter, main findings of the comparative analysis will be summarized and interpreted.
Chapter V

Comparative Analysis of Turkish and Canadian Counter-terrorism Policing

Introduction

Current structures and functions of the police organizations are connected to the historic development of the police as agents of social control, and in some countries, more closely tied to issues of national security (Greene & Herzog, 2009). Along with the change in the roles and functions of the police over time, organizational structures of policing have also been challenged. There has been a strengthening or weakening of police culture and the acceptance of the police by the larger community is consistently being tested (Greene & Herzog, 2009). According to Greene and Herzog (2009), in democracies, this continuous “testing” of the borders of social control is perhaps inevitable, due to inherent tensions between social control and individual liberties.

There have been different trends and reforms in policing throughout history such as the introduction of community-oriented, problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing models. According to Greene and Herzog (2009) these changes in policing have generally been externally motivated and internally resisted. Police organizations have often been slow to change like other bureaucracies. Changes in organizational structures, cultures, and strategies of the police organizations are now being further encouraged by increasing environmental pressures to address terrorism as well as crime. Recognizing that all terrorism is local, at least in terms of impact and consequence, police throughout the world are more adapted to civic concern about terrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007; Greene & Herzog, 2009). Nevertheless, despite the attempts of the police to address terrorism by seeking to link crime responses (the processes, structures, networks, and analytics associated with crime
prevention and detection), policing terrorism is different than policing crime, although the two occasionally overlap (Greene & Herzog, 2009).

This chapter examines how Turkish and Canadian police organizations focus on matters of terrorism. This examination is directed by the theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism which constitute the underlying philosophical basis for law enforcement’s terrorism response. The three-model typology proposed by Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) in regards to counter-terrorism strategies employed by liberal democracies will constitute the main theoretical framework the current analysis draws on. The data informing this analysis is based on textual and event analysis of a number of documents connected to the two police organizations. By analyzing the institutional, organizational and operational contours of counter-terrorism policing in Turkey and Canada, this chapter will seek to explore the evolving role of each respective police system and how each focuses on matters of domestic and global terrorism.

**Institutional Level of Analysis**

As discussed in Chapter 3, the historical experience with terrorism and the historical development of each country’s policing structures have shaped the police response to terrorism in each country. Turkey has experienced concerns with terrorist activities and national security issues from its inception in 1923 to the present. On the other hand, Canada, has been relatively unaffected by domestic and international acts of terrorism until very recently. Policing in Canada has not confronted a constant existential-strategic threat which Turkey has faced, that is, ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism threat against the ongoing integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state. Since its inception, the Canadian public has generally experienced a benevolent environment with terrorist activities being limited to being aimed at the Canadian government. This situation had its own impact on the development of Canadian counter-terrorism policing.
In fighting with ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism originating from PKK terrorist organization, Turkey employed the military as the primary instrument in countering terrorism. That is, Turkey evidently adopted a war model in combatting terrorism. Turkish armed forces deployed about 145,000 troops in the southeastern region of Turkey in the early 1990s at the time when the conflict was at its most intense period (Ekici, Ozkan, & Demir, 2007). The military forces took over the decision-making role and engaged in conducting counter-terrorism operations. During the fight against PKK terrorism, in many instances the police, although legally not required, became subordinate to the military and the police also made use of similar tactics as of the military (Ekici & Erdem, 2009). The police have been under the total control of the state and responsive to the state identified problems (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The police agencies adopted the idea that the fight against terrorism had to rely on weapons, military tactics, and classic policing methods and their response, especially in the early stages of the threat, was more reactive in nature rather than proactive (Ekici & Erdem, 2009; Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The Turkish National Police was heavily influenced by the war model adopted by the Turkish state in responding to terrorism.

In the following years, especially after 2000, along with the changing nature of the threat of terrorism in Turkey, the TNP has started to play a more active role in state counter-terrorism activities. A paradigm shift in counter-terrorism in Turkey which brought with it the gradual abandonment of the war model and the adoption of a criminal justice model instead resulted in an increasing engagement of the TNP in counter-terrorism operations and investigations. Particularly, starting in 2000, the TNP has passed through a fast self-renovation (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). In parallel with the country’s efforts to join the European Union (EU), the TNP has improved the quality of its equipment, infrastructure and most importantly its recruitment and training procedures (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). All these developments have contributed to the provision
of better policing services. Additionally, increasing importance attached to the prevention of human rights violations have created a solid understanding of rule of law and respect for civil liberties among the TNP members (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). As a result of improving professionalism and the success in eliminating terrorist threat proliferating in urban centres, Turkish police have extensively been involved in the prevention and detection of terrorist activities. At some point, the Turkish National Police officials argue that 85% of overall anti-terrorist operations conducted in Turkey in the last few years were administered by the TNP intelligence and counter-terrorism units (Turkish National Police, 2014).

A review of the historical experience with terrorism and national security activities in Canada indicates that the RCMP had the primary responsibility in both national security intelligence gathering and law enforcement until the 1980s (O’Connor, 2006). The evolution of the RCMP’s organizational structure reflected an increasing differentiation of the national security work and intelligence function from the RCMP’s other criminal investigative work. The Security Service of the RCMP was created in order to perform the security intelligence function. This period in the history of the RCMP national security activities (1936-1970) may be referred to as a term in which an extended version of criminal justice approach was increasingly being adopted by the RCMP (O’Connor, 2006). During the October Crisis of 1970, Canada opted to respond to terrorism by declaring martial law under the War Measures Act, suspending normal civil liberties, detaining individuals without charge and legal counsel, and by extensively using military as the main force responding to terrorism. These patterns clearly fit the war model approach in combatting terrorism. Violation of civil liberties during and in the immediate aftermath of the October Crisis triggered the enactment of a constitutional bill of rights, the Charter, in 1982 and the removal of national security intelligence collection from the RCMP and transfer of this duty to the CSIS in 1984.
Starting with the Air India bombing in 1985 and afterwards, it can be argued that Canadian counter-terrorism has followed a criminal justice approach to terrorism. At this time, Canada has had a troubled history in regards to terrorism investigations and prosecutions (Roach, 2012a). The collapse of the prosecution of the suspected mastermind of the Air India bombing is an example of these failed terrorism prosecutions (Roach, 2012a). In this case, the judge ordered that a wiretap warrant could not be sustained under the Charter without the disclosure of information that would reveal the identity of an informant. Given that the criminal justice model in combatting terrorism subordinates the war against terror to rigid liberal constitutional boundaries (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001; Perliger, 2012), Canada seems to have adopted a rigid criminal justice approach to terrorism. Additionally, an inquiry into Air India bombing in 2006 evidenced a lack of cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS before and after the bombing which eventually caused deadly results.

All these events led to subsequent changes in Canadian counter-terrorism policies. According to Svendsen (2010, p. 320), especially since 2004 when Canada’s National Security Policy was published, Canada has adopted a risk pre-emption approach to terrorism which “helps to reduce risk, allowing risks to be dealt with on more of an a priori (deterrence) basis rather than more on a post facto (firefighting) basis”. The underlying principle in this approach is that intelligence and security agencies should ideally be ahead of the curve, rather than being more behind that dynamic, in their efforts against terrorism (Svendsen, 2010). This emphasizes the importance of quality intelligence in responding to terrorism. Based on the operational aspects of the expanded criminal justice model which entail broadening cooperation between police and intelligence bodies and the use of surveillance techniques and gathering intelligence data as the nature of response, it can be argued that this model has been successfully adopted by the Canadian
state and law enforcement units. Successful disruption of the so-called Toronto 18 terror cell in June 2006 as a result of a good cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS may be regarded as a clear evidence of this situation.

In terms of the general development of policing structures, there are differences between the two countries. Canada has a decentralized system of policing involving federal, provincial and municipal police agencies. On the other hand, policing in Turkey is highly centralized and coordinated. This institutional dimension of policing in Turkey may facilitate a coordinated response to terrorism by police units. In Canada, where policing is distributed across many administrative jurisdictions, coordination mechanisms such as joint task forces or fusion centers appear to be the most suitable tools for the coordination of information exchange and police response to terrorism. Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) of RCMP, which bring together federal, provincial and municipal police and intelligence resources in order to collect, share and analyze information about criminal threats to national security and criminal extremism/terrorism, are an obvious example of attempts to coordinate counter-terrorism policing efforts and to broaden cooperation between police and intelligence bodies.

The case of INSETs suggests the adoption of the widened criminal justice model by the Canadian officials. That is because one of the fundamental operational aspects of this approach is that it entails an expanded cooperation between police and civilian intelligence units (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The creation and proper functioning of these INSETs may contribute to the removal of obstacles to building an effective and coordinated terrorism response system which can be induced by the fragmented nature of Canadian policing and the relative absence of experience with terrorism.
A significant point of discussion within the institutional context is the legislative framework in which the police agencies of the two countries rely on while dealing with terrorism. Canada has relied on domestic criminal law to address terrorism. In spite of its prior experience with terrorism, Canada did not have any specific counter-terrorism legislation prior to 9/11 (Morag, 2011). In Canada, before 9/11, the Criminal Code had been amended periodically for the integration and implementation of UN counter-terrorism instruments (conventions) which had been adopted since 1970 (Morag, 2011; Public Safety Canada, 2013). Terrorism was addressed by employing the normal processes of investigation, prosecution and conviction under the Criminal Code.

In 18 December 2001, Canada enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The Act does not stand as a self-contained piece of legislation on counter-terrorism and instead amended a number of federal statues, including the Criminal Code 1985, the Official Secrets Act 1985, the Canada Evidence Act 1985, and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act 2000 (Conte, 2010). This act added a section in the Canadian Criminal Code which defines terrorism and provides a list of terrorism offences such as providing or making available property or services for terrorist purposes, participating in or contributing to activities of a terrorist group, facilitating terrorist activity, harbouring or concealing terrorists and use of explosive or other lethal device. These offences are specifically defined as illegal whether or not the terrorist activity is actually carried out and these provisions also do not require the accused person to be aware of the specific nature of the planned terrorist activity. Morag (2011) argues that this enables the authorities to use the law in a preventive fashion in addition to punishment after the fact. The ATA as well provided for stricter penalties for terrorism offences and new investigative powers to both the law enforcement
and national security agencies such as preventive arrests, investigative hearings, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.

The definition of terrorism in the ATA was inspired by the very broad definition of terrorism in the UK’s Terrorism Act, 2000 (Roach, 2012b). Although Canada took a more restrained approach than the British legislation, its definition of terrorism remains much broader than the definition used in the October Crisis (Roach, 2011). The Canadian definition of terrorism which is also employed by the RCMP includes not only violence but also substantial property damage that endangers life, health, and safety, and disruption of essential services whether public or private. As Morag (2011) argues, broad definitions of terrorism enable the authorities to be proactive rather than just reactive and to enjoy broader pre-emptive powers in dealing with terrorism plots and pre-attack activities. In the same issue, Deflem (2004, p. 86) argues that the definition of terrorism in vague and general terms “becomes a powerful and highly consequential basis for police work”.

Broad definitions of terrorism thus provide the police organizations with a great flexibility in addressing issues of terrorism. Roach (2011) states that the anti-terrorism legislation enacted after 9/11 generally defined terrorism more broadly to recognize that not only the state but also the citizens and even corporations could be victims of terrorism. The broad definition of terrorism that Canada utilizes includes references to actions designed to intimidate the public or a segment with regard to its security, including its economic security and also actions intended to compel a person as well as a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act. Within the framework of this definition, domestic or international organizations could be corporations and acts targeting corporations could be acts of terrorism. However, as Roach argues (2011), although this very broad definition of terrorism in the ATA recognized the
vulnerabilities of modern societies, such as cyber terrorism, it also heightened the risk that anti-
globalization and aboriginal protesters who targeted corporations could be regarded as terrorists.

Turkey has had a specific counter-terrorism legislation, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act 3713, since 12 April 1991. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991) provides a definition of terrorism and terrorist offender. The Act defines terrorism as a) any kind of criminal act done by one or more persons b) belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the republic as specified in the constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, c) damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, d) endangering the existence of the Turkish State and republic, e) weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the state, f) eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the state, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat (The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act, 1991). As is seen, Turkey as well employs a very broad definition of terrorism that provides the TNP and other law enforcement agencies with a great flexibility in addressing terrorism. It can be inferred from this definition that the main target of terrorist activities is figured out as the state itself. The Turkish definition of terrorism does not include the neo-liberal provisions reflected in the Canadian definition of terrorism such as the targeting of corporations or serious disruption of a private essential service, facility or system.

According to the Act, a person who is a member of an organization that was established to achieve the purposes specified in the definition of terrorism and commits crimes in the direction of these aims alone or together with the others is considered a terrorist offender. Additionally, a person who is a member of these organizations is considered a terrorist offender even if he/she did not commit any planned terrorist activity. That means, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991),
unlike the Canadian legislation, criminalizes membership in a terrorist group. Also, according to the Act, a person who is not a member of any terrorist group but commits crimes on behalf of a terrorist group is also legally treated as a terrorist offender. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act provides a list of terrorism offences under the Turkish Criminal Code as well as a list of crimes regarded as terrorism offences if committed in association with a terrorist organization. The Act as well anticipates increases for the penalties to be imposed for these crimes under the Criminal Code. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act, unlike the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act6, criminalizes the advocacy, glorification and the encouragement of terrorism. According to the provisions of the Act, a person who makes the propaganda of a terrorist organization by advocating, glorifying or encouraging its violent acts is liable to 1 to 5 years imprisonment (The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act, 1991).

Organizational and Operational Levels of Analysis

An organizational level analysis of policing in Turkey and Canada shows that both the TNP and the RCMP have created specialized units in order to address terrorism and intelligence issues. From this aspect, it can be argued that the expanded criminal justice model rather than a sole application of the criminal justice approach is enforced by the two police organizations (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). In both Turkey and Canada, forces responding to terrorism are primarily police services, however, the responsibility of dealing with terrorism prevention and investigation is imposed on special branches and units inside the police organizations. Although both Turkey and Canada legally treat terrorism as a kind of criminal act, the police units dealing with terrorism issues are not the same units dealing with ordinary criminal offences. In Turkey, the security role of the police is highly developed with considerable

6 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2015, publicly known as the Bill C-51, which passed the Senate on June 9, 2015 creates a new speech-related criminal offence of “promoting” or “advocating” terrorism.
specialization. Inside the TNP, there are specialized units dealing with the prevention, investigation and suppression of terrorism such as the Intelligence Department, Counter-terrorism Department and the Special Operations Department. The roles and functions of these specialized units in counter-terrorism were examined in detail in Chapter 3.

Within the context of the RCMP, the National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) program aims to reduce the threat of terrorist criminal activity in Canada and abroad by preventing, detecting, investigating, and gathering evidence to support the prosecution of those involved in national security-related criminal acts (RCMP, 2015). NSCI was separated from the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) of the RCMP on October 1, 2006 and became a standalone program which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner. I argue that this is a significant development in terms of a paradigm shift in the perception of counter-terrorism by the RCMP. As also stated in the report regarding the RCMP actions in response to recommendations stemming from the O’Connor Inquiry, this separation is a recognition of the distinct nature of terrorism and terrorism investigations (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).

The Turkish National Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also created specialized police squads to deal with crisis situations, such as a hostage-taking or hijacking and for responding to terrorists in case of armed conflict. Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 148) argue that “these unique capabilities allow police forces to bridge the existing gap between their established abilities in the treatment of civilians and the need for new abilities to address high levels of violence with paramilitary tactics”. Special Operations Units (Ozel Harekat Timleri) within the TNP and the Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) of the RCMP are the specialized police units which are tasked with dealing these kinds of emergencies. According to Greene and Herzog (2009), the expanded criminal justice model raises some concerns about the conditions under
which these specialized police units are activated and sustained. Although these units are focused
towards activity in what may be considered “war situations in civilian arenas”, there is also a
danger that the government may employ them in problematic situations, such as mass order
disturbances, demonstrations, and crime prevention activities, among others (Greene & Herzog,
2009). Therefore, police special units and their activities need a strong oversight mechanism.
Policy makers should be aware that overuse of these units may become problematic and should
intensify their supervision beyond standard police controls (Perliger et al., 2009).

Reliable intelligence is an essential tool in the fight against terrorism. Although intelligence
collection in itself will not stop terrorists, the effectiveness of other operations to thwart terrorist
acts is contingent upon the ability to gather information about terrorists’ future plans and intentions
(Perliger et al., 2009). A failure in the intelligence function of the state security agencies can result
in a number of serious consequences for counter-terrorism. First, insufficient intelligence may
eventually encourage the terrorist group to escalate its campaign of insurgent violence as they may
see this as an advantage or window of opportunity being offered to them (Reinares, 1998).
Secondly, a lack of reliable intelligence may cause the state security services not to be able to make
the necessary distinctions between terrorists and innocent civilians. This, in turn, may encourage
repressive and indiscriminate responses by the state which can stir up support for the insurgents,
at least in sectors of the society already emotionally or ideologically in sympathy with them
(Reinares, 1998). A reliable intelligence network is therefore indispensable for government
counter-terrorism campaigns to be effective and to be in line with the protection of human rights
and civil liberties. An essential point here is of course that intelligence gathering activities are
strictly fulfilled within the framework of law.
Police intelligence gathering has a distinct place among the intelligence efforts of governments. Today, in most countries across the world, the police services have their own intelligence departments or units. Indeed, police forces have considerable experience in gathering intelligence regarding a wide variety of crimes such as drugs, guns, organized crime and street gangs (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Perliger et al., 2009). Considering the far reaching human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities of police organizations regarding these kinds of criminal groups, it can be argued that police intelligence has the ability and experience to gather intelligence on terrorist groups. In this respect, Perliger et al. (2009) argue that being in continuous interaction with the community, having an ability to build trust and collaborative relationships, and having expertise in HUMINT operations among social networks based on primordial ties give the police the potential to be an essential tool in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering.

In Turkey, the intelligence role of the police is highly developed. There is considerably more intelligence gathering and local surveillance on matters of terrorism. According to the Turkish Police Duties and Powers Act (1985), the Turkish National Police has jurisdiction to gather intelligence across the country and cooperates with the other intelligence bodies of the state. In Turkey, the police operate in a pre-emptive mode in regard to terrorism. The main goal is to maintain effective surveillance of the leaders and active supporters who make up a rather small number that can be easily contained by effective enforcement (Haberfeld et al., 2009). With the help of pre-emptive operations that are based on quality intelligence, the TNP counter-terrorism units mainly aim to stop the groups or networks who have a potential to carry out attacks.

In gathering intelligence, the Turkish National Police employ a variety of techniques including technical and electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, wiretapping, and HUMINT operations. Wiretapping and surveillance for intelligence purposes require prior authorization in
the form of a judicial warrant (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). However, in certain urgent situations, a senior law enforcement officer (The chief of TNP or the head of TNP Intelligence Department) can also authorize the police to start the interception procedure (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). This written authorization, however, must be brought before a court judge within 24 hours, and the judge can authorize the measure or disapprove it (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). In the Turkish system, there are two types of interception of private communications. One is for intelligence purposes and is carried out in accordance with the rules mentioned above. The second type is for criminal investigation and evidence purposes. This type of wiretapping is subject to judicial authorization by a judge or prosecutor in exigent circumstances and the length of the measure is different from the one executed for intelligence purpose (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). A difference of this type of interception is the requirement for the notification of the suspect who is subject to electronic surveillance.

In addition to technical and electronic surveillance, HUMINT is an important component of TNP intelligence infrastructure. According to Reinares (1998), except for non-classified data and high-technology surveillance, the type of intelligence most likely to be of use is often that which is furnished by informers and by agents infiltrated into the terrorists’ own ranks. Despite its dangers, the most effective way of infiltration into terrorist groups is human intelligence which entails the use of informants or undercover police officers. In regard to the advantage of human intelligence, Goktepe and Erciktı (2007, p. 391) argue that “the use of technical intelligence cannot provide the benefit of analysis that is possible from human sources, which are able to pick up many subtle signs and indications that cannot be accessed through technical sources”. The TNP, taking into account the different motivations and ideological orientations of terrorist groups and members,
widely employs informants in its intelligence collection activities. On the other hand, using undercover officers in order to infiltrate terrorist organizations is not a preferred method for the TNP as this kind of operation may run greater personal risks for the officers involved. The use of confidential human sources (informants) has greatly contributed to the success of counter-terrorism operations carried out by the TNP. As is seen from the above mentioned discussion, the Turkish National Police employs an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism, because the nature of the response to terrorism includes surveillance techniques and gathering intelligence with the intention of arrest and penalization of terrorists (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The TNP also continues to share intelligence obtained in the course of anti-terrorism investigations with domestic and foreign law enforcement and security/intelligence agencies.

In Canada, the intelligence role of the police has been restricted. Before the creation of CSIS in 1984, the RCMP’s Security Service was responsible for collecting intelligence on terrorist threats, but abuses by the RCMP Security Service in the aftermath of the October Crisis in 1970 led the Canadian government to conclude that law enforcement and security intelligence functions needed to be separated (Charters, 2008; Morag, 2011; O’Connor, 2006; Roach, 2012a). As a result, security intelligence collection functions were removed from the RCMP and transferred to the newly established civilian security service, CSIS. The excessive response of the RCMP Security Service to the FLQ’s terrorist campaign which was not constrained by proper ministerial guidance and supervision or by sensitivity to the differences between legal political dissent and genuine subversion, resulted in a lengthy investigation (Charters, 2008). This was the McDonald Commission which was appointed to inquire into certain activities of the RCMP (Charters, 2008).

The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001 served to reinvigorate the intelligence and counter-terrorism roles of the RCMP (Rudner, 2004). Since terrorism and related activities
were defined as crimes, the law enforcement imperatives of the Anti-Terrorism Act led the RCMP to promptly improve its intelligence capacity to combat terrorism (Rudner, 2004). In order to fulfill its national security protection and counter-terrorism roles and responsibilities, the RCMP moved to investigations that are integrated and intelligence-led, focusing on national strategic priorities including terrorism (Hanniman, 2007). At this point, the concept of “intelligence-led policing” is critical for understanding the role of intelligence in the RCMP’s national security investigations. Intelligence-led policing is a new approach to policing which involves the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels (O’Connor, 2006). The McDonald Commission Report envisaged a clear division between the security intelligence function and the law enforcement function, however, there is a significant overlap between these functions. According to O’Connor (2006) an important element of this overlap was the development by the RCMP of an intelligence-led policing approach. This approach was adopted by the RCMP in the investigation of various types of criminal activity.

In the national security context, intelligence-led policing has resulted in the RCMP engaging in activities very similar to those CSIS engages, despite its being for different eventual purposes (O’Connor, 2006). The RCMP collects intelligence for policing purposes such as preventing crimes or laying charges, whereas the CSIS collects intelligence for the purpose of advising the government about threats to the security of Canada. The reason for which intelligence is collected determines the difference between the terms of “criminal intelligence” and the “security intelligence”. However, as O’Connor (2006) states, in the national security context, distinction between the two may blur in practical application and the same information can be both criminal intelligence and security intelligence. Today, the RCMP has an intelligence-gathering
role arising out of its crime prevention and criminal apprehension role related to its national security mandate.

In terms of the intelligence gathering function of the RCMP, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 authorized and facilitated the use of investigative tools such as electronic surveillance. As in Turkey, the use of electronic surveillance has to be approved by a judge to ensure that these powers are used appropriately (Hanniman, 2007). However, the Anti-Terrorism Act also made it easier to obtain wiretap warrants in terrorism investigations by removing the requirement to satisfy the judge that other investigative techniques have been tried and failed or would not be sufficient. Moreover, the ATA provisions increased the authorization period for the interception of communications to one year, and allowed three years before the targets had to be informed that they were the subject of electronic surveillance by the police (Roach, 2011). These changes certainly reinforced the intelligence function of the RCMP in its terrorism investigations.

Alongside the collection of intelligence, dissemination and sharing of the acquired intelligence is crucial as well. Integration facilitates cooperation and information sharing, which is the lifeblood of law enforcement (Hanniman, 2007). In Canada, there were several triggers of the idea of integrated policing and increased information sharing between security agencies. These were the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the inflow of extra money for security after 9/11, the findings of the Major Commission of Inquiry into the Air India bombing, and the O’Connor Commission of Inquiry on the Maher Arar investigation (Kitchen, 2014). A significant reason underlying both the Air India tragedy and the Maher Arar case was the poor cooperation between Canadian security agencies, namely, the RCMP and the CSIS. One of the arguments in establishing integrated policing mechanisms and improving cooperation between the RCMP and the CSIS was to avoid another Air India bombing but also prevent another Maher Arar (Kitchen, 2014). Having
recognized the detrimental results of a lack of cooperation between agencies dealing with national security issues, Canada does want to engage all stakeholders in the prevention of terrorism through the establishment of integrated information sharing and cooperation structures.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police aims to achieve operational coordination and tactical cooperation with CSIS and other federal agencies, other levels of government such as provincial and municipal police agencies, and also with counterparts in the US, through the establishment of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) (Rudner, 2004). These multi-agency structures are an important tool for broadening cooperation between police and intelligence bodies, coordinating responses to terrorism, improving police effectiveness in addressing terrorism and creating a data collection and analytic focus to better understand risk and response. Greene and Herzog (2009) argue that these type of partnerships also help local agencies which do not have the same capacity to integrate information and data from several sources as the national-level or federal agencies.

At the same time, these structures can also have some disadvantages. In her study on the effectiveness and effects of Canada’s INSETs, Kitchen (2014) talks about the general trends observed in national security policing in Canada. She argues that the integration and the creation of INSETs in Canada encourage a trend of formalization which will ensure that all laws, rules, and regulations are followed in national security policing. She suggests that this is, a trend of coordination and skill building, and a trend of gathering and sharing more and more data. Kitchen (2014) argues that integration may bring together some risks such as the disappearance of productive disagreement and other problems associated with excessive data gathering and the problems due to a lack of integrated review and complaints mechanism (Kitchen, 2014).
In order to expand cooperation, the RCMP and the CSIS signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in September 2006 (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). This memorandum delineated the respective mandates of each organization and proposed initiatives aimed at providing mutual support. Canada’s National Security Policy of 2004 also established an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) which is responsible for providing comprehensive and integrated analyses of potential terrorist threats to Canada for timely dissemination to agencies with national security or public safety responsibilities (Rudner, 2004). These threat assessments are generated as a result of intelligence coming from across departments and agencies and external partners. The RCMP is one of the primary federal government agencies comprising the ITAC (Rudner, 2004).

The literature suggests that there is a lack of cooperation and exchange of intelligence between the TNP and the other Turkish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. For example, Haberfeld et al. (2009) discuss about the lack of cooperation and the disconnect between the TNP and the Turkish Gendarmerie in fighting terrorism. In Turkey, recently established partnerships such as the National Intelligence Coordination Board (Milli Istihbarat Koordinasyon Kurulu-MIKK) and the National Intelligence Coordination Centers (Milli Istihbarat Koordinasyon Merkezleri-MIKM) are designed as the primary tools for promoting effective intelligence sharing between state security agencies including the TNP (Turkish National Intelligence Organization, 2015). However, the effectiveness and functionality of these newly established structures are yet to be seen. There are questions regarding whether they will be plagued by problems such as the withholding of information from each other. Taking into account the insufficiency of the current mechanisms of cooperation between the TNP and The Turkish National Intelligence Organization
(MIT), success or failure of these newly established mechanisms is critical for the future counter-terrorism efforts and coordination.

Based on the preceding comparison, it can be argued that the RCMP embraces an expanded criminal justice model rather than a strict criminal justice approach in regard to terrorism. This is because there appears to be broadening cooperation between police and intelligence bodies and the increased employment of intelligence methods such as technical and electronical surveillance as part of the main operational aspects of such a widened criminal justice approach to terrorism (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001; Perliger, 2012). These measures are at the disposal of the RCMP in responding to terrorism.

An examination of police powers in relation to terrorism investigations is also relevant in terms of understanding the differences between Turkish and Canadian approaches to countering terrorism. The success of counter-terrorism efforts relies on reducing the number of terrorists that are operational at any given time and, especially, reducing the number of skilled operational terrorists in circulation (Morag, 2011). This can be achieved through either a policy of eliminating terrorists, or the restriction of the freedom of movement of terrorists which can impede the planning, organization and execution of terrorist attacks. Morag (2011) states that there are basically three ways to restrain a person’s physical and electronic mobility: through physical detention in a detention facility, through physical detention at a person’s residence or other location, or partial restriction of mobility through banning contact between a suspect and specific persons, or banning access to phones and/or the Internet. This form of detention, or partial restriction of mobility, can be preventive and designed to disrupt terrorist activities and prevent terrorist attacks or it can be a measure of punishment (Morag, 2011).
Following 9/11, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) enacted by the Canadian government provided for new police powers including the power of preventive arrests. Preventive arrest powers allowed law enforcement officials to arrest a person when there were reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist activity would be carried out and reasonable suspicion that an arrest or imposition of conditions was necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity. Canadian preventive arrest powers were, however, more restrained compared to British and Australian provisions (Roach, 2012b). Preventive arrests in Canada required the pre-approval of both the attorney general and, except in exigent circumstances, the judicial pre-approval of a judge (Roach, 2011). Preventive arrest powers were expired in 2007 as the original legislation had included sunset provisions and until that time no preventive arrests had been made under the ATA. However, preventive arrest powers were re-enacted with the amendment of the section 83.3 of the Criminal Code by the *Combating Terrorism Act* in 2013. The current anti-terrorism sections of the Canadian Criminal Code contain provisions which allow a peace officer to lay an information before a provincial court judge if the peace officer:

(a) believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be carried out; and

(b) suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or the arrest of a person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.

According to current provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code (1985), a law enforcement officer may also arrest a person without a warrant and cause the person to be detained in custody in order to bring them before a provincial court judge in case:

(a) exigent circumstances exist and laying an information is impracticable; and
(b) the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person in custody is necessary to prevent a terrorist activity.

Preventive arrest powers are subject to criticism by scholars. Ruby and Hasan (2015) argue that preventive detention contradicts the Canadian legal tradition of prosecuting and punishing crimes which have been committed already, and only after those offences have been proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. That means, a preventive arrest which is based on the suspicion that someone may or will commit crime at some point in the future is contrary to the legal tradition and is also incompatible with the constitutionally protected right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty which is described in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 7 and section 11 (d) (Ruby & Hasan, 2015).

Bill C-51, which aims to expand the powers of Canadian security and law enforcement agencies such as the CSIS and the RCMP in dealing with terrorism, also introduces some changes regarding the preventive arrest powers of the police. The proposed amendments in the Bill C-51 will provide for new and lower thresholds for preventive arrest and detention (Parliament of Canada, 2015). The new measures proposed by the Bill C-51 will allow law enforcement agencies to arrest a person in case they suspect that a terrorist act “may be carried out”, instead of the current standard of “will be carried out” (Ruby & Hasan, 2015). Bill C-51 also replaces “necessary” for “likely” so that s. 83.3(2) of the Criminal Code would now enable a peace officer to lay an information or make an arrest without warrant if the officer:

(a) believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity may (instead of will) be carried out; and
(b) suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or the arrest of a person, is likely (instead of necessary) to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity (Ruby & Hasan, 2015).

As is seen, both of these changes lead to a significant lowering of the standards for preventive arrest/detention measures (Ruby & Hasan, 2015). Preventive/administrative arrests are one of the major components of the operational aspects/nature of response in terms of the expanded criminal justice model in countering terrorism (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). Preventive arrest powers were never used in Canada from 2001 to 2007 when they were expired by the sunset of the ATA (Roach, 2011). Re-introduction of these powers through the Combating Terrorism Act in 2013 and the proposed lowering of the threshold for preventive arrests/detentions by the amendments in the Criminal Code by the Bill C-51, suggest that Canada has adopted and institutionalized an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism rather than a model in which terrorism is treated in a manner similar to ordinary criminality.

In the context of Turkey, the legislation has not provided for preventive arrest powers to the police for specific use in terrorism cases. The legislation grants the power of preventive/administrative arrest to the law enforcement in certain circumstances, however, there is not a specific attribution to offences of terrorism in these cases. The preventive/administrative arrest power granted to the Turkish National Police by the No. 2559 Police Duties and Powers Act (1985) section 13, is aimed at the arrest of a person who:

- disturbs the public order by getting excessively drunk and by fighting, quarreling and attempting to attack others,
- illegally enters the country or is subject to a deportation or extradition decision,
is a mentally disordered person, drug or alcohol addict who is legally subject to medical
treatment, education or correction in an institution, or is a person who may contaminate
infectious diseases and constitutes a danger for the public health,

- is a minor subject to detention at a correctional facility or subject to a decision allowing
  him/her to be brought in front of competent authorities,

- endangers the safety of other people.

As is seen from the provisions in the legislation, the application of preventive arrests in
Turkey is very limited. Turkish legislation does not provide for a preventive arrest power which
allows the police to arrest a person on the suspicion that he/she may or will commit a terrorism
offence at some point in the future. However, the new provision which has recently been proposed
by an amendment to the Police Duties and Powers Act in 2015 and which contains the preventive
arrest of a person who “endangers the safety of other people” is overly broad and vague. It is yet to
be seen whether this provision may be employed by the police for the preventive arrest of people on
terrorism charges.

The Canadian legislation provides the RCMP with a power of investigative hearings. This
is a mechanism to compel a person to answer questions relating to terrorist activities either in the
past or the future (Roach, 2011). Investigative hearings expired in 2007 together with the power of
preventive arrest. However, they were re-enacted by subsequent legislation. In the new legislation,
on the consent of the Attorney General, a peace officer may apply to a judge in private for an order
directing individuals with information relevant to an ongoing investigation of a terrorism offence to
appear before a judge and provide information (O’Connor, 2006). The power of investigative
hearings raised some debates in Canada. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld its
constitutionality (Roach, 2012b). The Turkish National Police do not have the power of applying
for the establishment of an investigative hearing. In terms of other police powers to investigate terrorism, both the TNP and the RCMP make use of judicial arrests, police custody, search and seizure powers, and a wide range of surveillance powers.

One of the most crucial components of the counter-terrorism process is the prevention of terrorist activities by addressing the factors that motivate individuals to engage in terrorism-related activities and intervening and disrupting the terrorist identity building process and radicalization leading to violence. Terrorist organizations need an ideology, domestic and international support, money and human resources to keep up their activities. Human capital is probably the most important element as terrorist organizations do not have a chance to sustain their activities without having the support of adequate manpower. Therefore, terrorist groups attach great importance to their recruitment efforts. The law enforcement units dealing with terrorism should be aware of the fact that their activities also need to be targeted at depleting the human sources of a terrorist organization. Accordingly, security and law enforcement agencies across the world increasingly seek to prevent the engagement of individuals in terrorist organizations by addressing reasons for radicalization leading to violence and searching the ways for dealing with this phenomena.

Studies of radicalization investigate the processes through which individuals become socialized into engaging in terrorist violence without moral restraints (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Sprinzak (1991, p. 59) refers to the study of terrorism as “the study of human transformation, of a psycho-political passage in time from normal to extra-normal behaviour”. While investigating the reasons for this transformation, some theories of radicalization shift the locus of psychological studies away from individual deviance and focus on the ways in which external influences transform otherwise normal individuals into potential terrorists (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Thus, some theories of radicalization concentrate on the ways external factors,
institutions and structures affect individuals in their decision to participate in terrorist violence (Sprinzak, 1991; Moghadam, 2005; Silbner & Bhatt, 2007; European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008). The criminal justice system is a crucial domain where individuals are most likely to experience the government in their lives. Karstedt and LaFree (2006) point out that encounters with criminal justice agents, particularly police, are an essential part of the living experience of democracy.

As one of the primary agents of social control and a fundamental component of the criminal justice system, the police are also invariably perceived as the representatives of the state. A strong bond of trust between the police and the public not only contributes to people’s sense of security and the quality of life but also encourages the development and sustainability of democracy. On the other hand, weakening or breaking of the bond of trust between the police and the public results in the erosion of democracy along with the public order and the governmental authority (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). This causes what Ehud Sprinzak (1991) calls “de-legitimization” which explains the movement of individuals, both psychologically and politically, from acceptable political activism to terrorism. Perception of the police as adversaries and as an instrument to deliver oppressive state policies in the interest of protecting the regime and the state leads to a “crisis of confidence” which is the first phase of radicalization process according to Sprinzak’s (1991) theory of transformational de-legitimization. De-legitimization of the agents of the regime leads to the de-legitimization, demonization and dehumanization of the system, ultimately resulting in political violence. Police organizations are, therefore, supposed to engage with individuals and communities in order to address potential political violence and to stop and/or reverse the process of radicalization leading to violent extremism.
The TNP has developed a number of initiatives to recognize and address individuals at risk of becoming radicalized to violence and becoming future recruits of terrorist groups. The main purpose of these initiatives is to disrupt the activities of terrorist organizations by thwarting the flow of potential recruits. A major initiative embraced by the TNP in preventing terrorist organizations’ activities is an intervention program called the “Informative and Preventive Activities (IPA-Bilgilendirme ve Onleme Faaliyetleri)” (Adana Police Department, 2013). IPA can be defined as “a comprehensive approach that intends to prevent terrorist organizations’ activities in legal and illegal settings through informative, preventive and operational strategies” (Adana Police Department, 2013).

IPA is a long process which continues through the pre-investigation, investigation, operation/arrest, prison and post-prison stages and aims to break up terrorist group sympathizers’ and active terrorist organization members’ ties with the extremist and terrorist groups. This process is also called the Counter-Terrorism Process (Adana Police Department, 2013). A distinguishing feature of the IPA process is that it involves not only potential recruits of terrorist organizations (at risk individuals) but also active and convicted terrorist organization members and their families. With this feature, the IPA may be entitled not only a counter-radicalization but also a de-radicalization and disengagement program which aims to achieve a cognitive rejection of non-democratic means, an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more be a part of society, – in other words, a change of mind in terrorists and behavioural distancing from the violent terrorist modus operandi which means the decrease or the cessation of violent actions (Schmid, 2013b). IPA is fundamentally an individual-based process, therefore, the TNP is employing an Individual Centered Procedural Approach Model in Counter-terrorism (ICPA) (Adana Police Department, 2013). ICPA can be defined as an approach which essentially aims to achieve
potential and active members’ disengagement from the organizational structure and disrupt terrorist activities through individually-tailored intervention programs, such as personal and family interviews, social support initiatives, mentoring and social projects (Adana Police Department, 2013).

A fundamental component of ICPA approach are interviews that are conducted with at-risk individuals (potential recruits), members of terrorist organizations and their families. These interviews are executed in all stages from first contact with the terrorist organization up to prison and post prison stages and aim to reverse the terrorist identity building process and to reintegrate the individual to the society (Adana Police Department, 2013). In these interviews, individuals and their families are informed about the activities of terrorist organizations in order to raise their awareness about the real face of terrorism. Individuals are also warned about the legal consequences of getting involved in terrorist activities. In case individuals give positive feedback in these interviews, they are also provided with social support in coordination with other institutions and organizations of the government.

Social opportunities such as vocational courses, educational funding, and dormitory opportunities for students etc., are provided as a means by which to reintegrate the ex-members to the society. The ICPA process is then a multi-institutional approach which also requires collaboration and coordination with other government agencies/institutions and NGOs (Adana Police Department, 2013). Another goal within the ICPA is to mitigate the unfavourable thoughts towards the state and its agents and to weaken the terrorist propaganda (Adana Police Department, 2013).

On the other hand, the IPA approach does not exclude counter-terrorism investigations, arrests and operations. The model offers a comprehensive approach and argues that both IPA
strategy and counter-terrorism operations should be put into practice based on the necessities and security threats (Adana Police Department, 2013). Within the scope of the IPA, individuals who do not disengage from terrorist organizations or continue their terrorist activities are subjected to legal and administrative sanctions including investigations, operations/arrests, and imprisonment. However, the IPA process continues through the investigation, operation/arrest, prison and post-prison stages in order to disengage individuals from the terrorist activities (Adana Police Department, 2013). The ICPA model can be summarized in Figure 1.

Figure-1: The Individual Centered Procedural Approach Model in Counter-terrorism (Adana Police Department, 2013)

Adana Police Department is one of the law enforcement agencies which is actively using ICPA approach in dealing with terrorism issues. Adana is the fourth largest city of Turkey in terms of economic development and population. Adana is also a city in which terrorist organizations such as PKK, DHKP/C, MLKP, and religiously motivated terrorist groups are actively operating in terms of fundraising, illegal protests and street demonstrations, recruitment, and acts of violence (Adana Police Department, 2013). According to the statistics of the Adana Police Department, between 2007 and 2012, 1730 interviews in total were conducted within the scope of the Informative and Preventive Activities (IPA) (Adana Police Department, 2013). This is the total number of interviews conducted for the prevention of leftist, separatist and religiously motivated
terrorism. In terms of the results regarding specific terrorist groups, in 2012, 74 families were interviewed for the prevention of the activities of leftist terrorist organizations carrying out armed actions such as the DHKP/C (Adana Police Department, 2013). Seventy three (98.6%) families provided positive feedback and 1 (1.4%) family provided negative feedback regarding interviews (Adana Police Department, 2013). Additionally, as a result of the interviews conducted with 24 newly recruited members of leftist terrorist organizations carrying out armed actions, all of these individuals were persuaded to disengage from terrorist activities (Adana Police Department, 2013). As a result of interviews aimed at 50 more veteran members of leftist terrorist organizations, 25 of them (50%) were observed to have totally abandoned or decreased their activities inside leftist terrorist groups (Adana Police Department, 2013). These results are surprising as the members of leftist terrorist organizations are known for their very high level of ideological devotion and it is very hard for security forces to penetrate into leftist terrorist organizations with traditional policing methods due to a high level of confidentiality.

The results give hope for the prevention of other types of terrorism as well. In a similar vein, in 2012, 51 interviews conducted with 24 families and aimed at the prevention of the recruitment activities of religiously motivated groups resulted in positive feedback from 19 families (79%) and negative feedback from 5 families (21%) (Adana Police Department, 2013). As a result of these interviews 20 people (42%) were disengaged from religiously motivated groups and 28 (58%) individuals were observed to continue their terrorist activities (Adana Police Department, 2013). Finally, according to the statistics of the Adana Police Department (2013), 463 interviews were conducted in 2012 with 375 individuals and their family members for the disruption of separatist terrorism. As a result of these personal and family interviews, out of 326 families who were interviewed, 316 families (97%) provided positive feedback and 10 families
(3%) provided negative feedback (Adana Police Department, 2013). Two hundred and twenty six (68%) out of 333 target individuals who were interviewed disengaged from the terrorist group, 12 (4%) of them were observed to have decreased their activities and 95 (28%) of them remained active terrorist supporters (Adana Police Department, 2013).

In summary, through the implementation of the IPA and ICPA approaches in counter-terrorism supported by a collaboration between different government institutions, the TNP mainly aim to prevent terrorist organizations from recruiting and maintaining individual militants. For that purpose, the TNP officers communicate and intervene with potential terrorist recruits, active terrorist group members and their families with a view for informing and making them aware about the real nature of terrorist activities and preventing the disinformation of terrorist groups. What is also aimed by these efforts is to ensure the reintegration of the ex-militants and potential terrorist supporters to the society by socially supporting them and to subject those who continue their activities and commit terrorist crimes to legal and administrative sanctions. Finally, the TNP aim to establish a communication channel between the police and the target audience and to mitigate anti-state attitudes by trying to solve problems and providing social support to individuals vulnerable to terrorist propaganda and their families. As Schmid (2013b) states, strengthening and maintaining a strong sense of legitimacy among the public regarding the fairness of the judicial and the political system is crucial for the success of counter-radicalization policies.

One of the four fundamental elements specified in Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy, is the Prevent element which aims to prevent individuals from participating in terrorism by addressing the motivations of individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in terrorist activities (Public Safety Canada, 2013). That is, the prevention of recruitment attempts by terrorist groups as well as the prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism is considered by
the Canadian authorities as an indispensable component of the counter-terrorism process. Accordingly, Canadian government authorities and police agencies seek to build partnerships with individuals and groups in Canadian communities based on the fact that “the means to help prevent violent extremism ultimately lie within communities” (Public Safety Canada, 2014, p. 36). Canadian authorities have developed a number of initiatives seeking to promote government-community partnerships for building prevention capacity in counter-terrorism. These initiatives are the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security jointly supported by Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice, and the RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach (NSCO) programs (Public Safety Canada, 2013). The main objectives of these initiatives are strengthening community cohesion and resilience against terrorism and fostering critical thinking about extremist messaging. These programs also aim to develop a better understanding of the threats posed by radicalization leading to violence and to secure the support of communities in counter-terrorism policies and measures (Edwards et al., 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2014). These kinds of initiatives also help come up with effective means to intervene during the radicalization to violence process (Edwards et al., 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2014).

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, aware that police agencies cannot effectively address the threat of terrorism and radicalization leading to violence through traditional investigation and police intervention methods alone, has developed a number of initiatives as part of the Prevent element of the Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy (Edwards et al., 2015). The most prominent of such initiatives is the National Security Community Outreach (NSCO) program which has been active since 2006. National Security Community Outreach is a community engagement program which is basically aimed at building trust between the police and the communities. It also aims to encourage ongoing dialogue regarding the key issues of concern related to national security by
addressing community concerns, identifying mutual goals and practicing open and respectful communication (Edwards et al., 2015). In keeping with the philosophy of community policing, another purpose of the creation of the RCMP’s NSCO Program is the involvement of the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious communities of Canada in the protection of Canada’s national security (Hanniman, 2008). The fundamental logic behind the community engagement activities of the police organizations is the idea that the counter-terrorism process is a responsibility shared by all members of society. Countering terrorism entails gaining the support and confidence of society and the involvement of the public in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures and policies. Moreover, particularly in regards to radicalization leading to violent extremism, family members, peers, religious and community figures are crucial partners of the law enforcement agencies in the recognition of and intervention to indicators of radicalization (Public Safety Canada, 2014).

Community engagement activities are one of the core functions of the RCMP’s INSETs. Within the scope of the RCMP’s NSCO program, the primary activity of the community-outreach coordinators assigned to each INSET includes establishing networks of key contacts within communities such as religious leaders, civil-society actors, etc., in order to build ongoing dialogue on important matters (Edwards et al., 2015). These issues vary from addressing potential extremists radicalizing to violence to identifying and addressing the concerns of minority communities. Other tasks of community outreach officers involve representing RCMP at cultural and targeted outreach events and acting as points of contact and spokespeople on behalf of the RCMP in the wake of major incidents (Edwards et al., 2015).

In addition to outreach and engagement efforts made within the scope of the NSCO program, the RCMP is also currently finalizing the implementation of its Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) program. This program aims to mobilize community resources and local law enforcement in order to recognize and address individuals who are at risk of becoming radicalized to violence (Public Safety Canada, 2014). RCMP’s new CVE program also seeks to engage communities on the topic of radicalization to violence in view of mitigating the home-grown terrorist threat through prevention in the pre-criminal space (TSAS, 2014). Canadian officials argue that the RCMP’s CVE program is not aimed at specific individuals or communities. They argue that it will focus on those who show signs of becoming engaged in violent extremist activity and who have been identified by law enforcement based on a number of pre-determined, unbiased and objective criteria that are grounded in research, or by the community itself. The CVE process will include awareness, education, tools and multi-agency involvement (TSAS, 2014). Disruptive actions such as investigation, arrest, prosecution and criminal charges will be enforced in case preventive action fails.

In a comparative context, it can be argued that the TNP’s IPA activities and the initiatives developed by the RCMP as part of the Prevent framework have common goals. In addition to traditional investigation and police intervention methods in counter-terrorism, both agencies carry out prevention-centered counter-terrorism activities such as the engagement by the police of at-risk individuals and communities and intervention to radicalization leading to violence. However, the two organizations differ in some points within the context of the implementation of preventive activities. The IPA approach implemented by the TNP continues through the whole counter-terrorism process including pre-investigation, investigation, arrest, prosecution, prison and post-prison phases. That is, engagement efforts are pursued in every stage of the counter-terrorism process. In addition to individuals who show signs of becoming engaged in violent extremist activity, but who have not yet been consolidated into the organizational structure of a terrorist
group or progressed to the execution of criminal terrorist activity, active terrorist group members who have already been radicalized and may have been subjected to investigation, arrest/detention, prosecution or imprisonment are also evaluated as the targets of the TNP’s IPA approach. Therefore, it can be argued that the TNP’s IPA program aims at the prevention of radicalization leading to violence as well as de-radicalization and disengagement of radicalised individuals and suspected or convicted terrorists.

In fact, as Schmid (2013b) states, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging discourse on de-radicalization and it often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at preventing radicalisation from taking place. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UN CTITF) Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism defines de-radicalisation as “programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence” (Schmid, 2013b, p. 40). One of the objectives of the TNP’s IPA approach is the reintegration of the disengaged and former members of terrorist groups back into society. In order to achieve this, various kinds of social support including finding jobs and providing education possibilities are provided to de-radicalized and/or disengaged terrorist group members (Adana Police Department, 2013).

The literature has also identified various instruments which are utilized to accomplish de-radicalization, or more often, disengagement (without de-radicalization) from a terrorist group. These tools include but are not limited to the role of go-betweens who can influence the terrorist (often from family or peer group), social measures (facilitating economic and social reintegration of the repentant terrorist), some form of continued/subsequent monitoring to avoid recidivism, and emphasis on family and peers, both as a support group and as a group towards which the repentant
has responsibility, as a father, son, husband, friend, etc. (Schmid, 2013b, p. 44). Based on the literature, it can be suggested that the measures implemented by the TNP as part of IPA efforts are as well designated to ensure de-radicalization and disengagement of the terrorist group members/sympathizers or radicalized individuals. Also, the term “radicalization” is not limited to jihadi terrorism in the context of the TNP counter-terrorism efforts. The TNP’s counter-radicalization, de-radicalization and disengagement attempts are implemented based on a broad understanding of the concept including not only religious extremism but also the leftist and ethno-nationalist/separatist extremism leading to violence.

On the other hand, based on the current programming of the prevention of radicalization leading to violence and other Prevent national counter-terrorism initiative, it is clear that the RCMP engagement efforts mainly focus on addressing at risk individuals through the collaboration of the community before these individuals proceed to the point where disruptive law enforcement action is warranted. The scope of the intervention and engagement programs within such a strategy is limited to the identification of potential radicals. This is different from the TNP’s IPA approach which continues throughout the whole counter-terrorism process and tries to achieve the individual’s complete breaking off his/her ties with the terrorist group, reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

The RCMP’s programming does not involve any specific attempt to disengage the radicalized individuals or suspected/convicted terrorists from terrorist groups or activity during the arrest, prosecution, or prison/post-prison phases and reintegrate them to the society through the provision of various kinds of social support or rehabilitation programs. The main focus in the RCMP’s initiative is on the intervention and the pre-emption of the risks. In this regard, the RCMP’s preventative work is essentially labeled counter-radicalization. This has been described
by the UN CTITF as “policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path to terrorism… specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists” (Schmid, 2013b).

Schmid (2013b) explains such counter-terrorism initiatives to be related to the current terrorist threat Western countries are facing. According to Schmid (2013b), the Western world including the European countries and recently US increasingly face the threat of homegrown jihadist terrorism. This has resulted in a partial shift of focus from de-radicalisation of terrorist suspects to preventive work in the local and foreign communities from which the terrorists emerge (Schmid, 2013b). Canada has been facing a threat of terrorist violence posed by home-grown violent extremists or potential lone-actor terrorists (Public Safety Canada, 2013; Public Safety Canada, 2014, Edwards et al., 2015). Accordingly, in parallel with the other Western countries facing the threat of homegrown extremism, Canada and the RCMP may have accelerated counter-radicalization efforts including community engagement, strengthening public resilience to extremism, addressing local grievances, and broadening community outreach. As Schmid (2013b) states, counter-radicalization efforts do not mainly focus on the terrorists themselves but rather on the strengthening and empowering of the community from which they might emerge and which might, if neglected, be deemed potentially supportive of them. Unlike the TNP’s IPA and ICPA approaches, the RCMP’s NSCO program and the forthcoming CVE program principally focus on communities rather than directly on the terrorists themselves. In this sense, they are indirect strategies (Schmid, 2013b).

Within this organizational and operational level of analysis, some focus is warranted in terms of police training issues. Training of police officers who will deal with terrorism cases and
serve in the counter-terrorism units is an issue worth explaining. Although research shows that it is a measure that has an indirect impact on counter-terrorism process, it should be kept in mind that effective counter-terrorism strategies require skilled personnel, and this can only be achieved through quality training. Extending the training of police officers to include terrorism and appropriate responses to the terrorist events is a new form of police work developed within the scope of an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism (Greene & Herzog, 2009). According to the expanded criminal justice model, responding to terrorism necessitates the operation of specialized units inside police departments that employ personnel skilled in counter-terrorism cases. A certain level of expertise and specific knowledge about terrorism and terrorist offences, counter-terrorism, the processes for information sharing, terrorism investigations, intelligence and national security matters is required for police officers who will serve in these units and investigate terrorism. As terrorism is regarded as an exceptional phenomenon which deviates from the standard definition of a felonious crime, acts of terrorism require special investigation techniques and procedures which may differ from those of ordinary crimes (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). As also stated by the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006), national security and terrorism investigations involve subject matter not within the expertise or experience of normal criminal investigators. On the other hand, counter-terrorism officers require all of the skills and expertise of criminal investigators, however, they should also be trained specifically in terrorism and national security related matters (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).

The Turkish National Police provides training programs for terrorism investigators who will serve in the anti-terrorism units and will be involved in its prevention, detection and response. All staff who serve in the specialized anti-terrorism units of the TNP receive basic training in
counter-terrorism and/or intelligence issues and continuously update their knowledge/expertise level through further in-service trainings dedicated to special topics. An intelligence officer who serves in the TNP Intelligence Department is required to receive the Basic Intelligence Course and depending on his/her expertise, he/she should receive special in-service training in topics such as technical intelligence, physical surveillance or electronic surveillance, IT based courses, and other kinds of self-development trainings. As such, specific courses are organized about different aspects of terrorism. The basic purpose of these trainings is to ensure professionalism and efficiency in counter-terrorism policing. Deflem’s (2004) bureaucratization theory of policing argues that police organizations achieve a high degree of institutional autonomy to determine the means and objectives of their counter-terrorism activities on the basis of professional expertise and knowledge.

Another aspect of the effectiveness in counter-terrorism policing is related to the practices and arrangements of international cooperation among police of different nations. Accordingly, the TNP conduct international law enforcement training programs with a view of strengthening the capacity of other countries to confront terrorism-related activities (Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011). The basic aim of these capacity building programs is to help reduce the overall terrorist threat by increasing the counter-terrorism abilities of partner states through the provision of required training and sharing of experience. In this context, the TNP provide the specialized anti-terrorism units of foreign states’ police institutions with courses including but not limited to:

- Homeland Security Intelligence,
- Counter-terrorism Intelligence,
- Basic Training of Special Police Forces,
• Hostage Negotiation Training,
• Basic Counter-terrorism Training,
• Digital Evidence Collection on Counter-terrorism,
• Prevention of Radicalization, and
• Investigation of Terrorist Crimes (Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011).

From the RCMP viewpoint, especially after the case of Maher Arar, the trainings and courses relating to national security investigations have been reviewed and redesigned (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). National security investigators within the RCMP are trained based on the specific needs of these investigations. The main areas in these trainings include Anti-Terrorism Act, information sharing with domestic and foreign partner agencies and within the RCMP, policy and procedure, countering terrorist financing, cultural diversity and awareness, privacy and human rights issues, and National Security criminal investigative techniques (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). Training programs such as the National Security Criminal Investigators Course, Cultural Awareness Orientation Workshop, Tactical Use of the Internet Workshop and Terrorist Financing Investigator’s Course are organized in order to ensure the proper training of national security investigators in the particular features of such investigations (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).

In addition to the training programs aimed at counter-terrorism investigators serving in the NSCI, the RCMP also operates a “Counter-terrorism Information Officer” initiative (RCMP, 2015). This aims to provide frontline police officers and other first responders with terrorism awareness training on key indicators of terrorist activities, techniques and practices in order to help identify terrorist threats at the earliest stage possible (Public Safety Canada, 2013). With the help of knowledge acquired through this training initiative, Counter Terrorism Information Officers are
able to inform and educate others within their workplace, thereby enhancing awareness and operational preparedness relating to terrorism (RCMP, 2015). In the context of Turkey, it is striking that although the terrorist threat level is distinctly higher than Canada, the TNP does not have a program like the RCMP’s Counter-terrorism Information Officer initiative which provides frontline patrol officers with a basic terrorism awareness training. As Haberfeld et al. (2009) state, patrol officers in the TNP do not receive specialized training in the area of counter-terrorism and are generally assumed that “they know enough” based on the long history of police efforts against the PKK. However, Haberfeld et al. (2009) argue that based on their conversations with patrol officers in Istanbul, it was not apparent that they know what they are dealing with, not from the perspective of intelligence gathering, surveillance, or any other relevant aspect of policing the threat.

In terms of international police training cooperation and capacity building efforts in countering terrorism, Canada is attempting to take action around the world. Within the scope of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development's (DFATD) Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP), Canada and the RCMP aim to help partner countries, through the provision of training, funding, equipment and technical and legal assistance, to prevent and respond to terrorism-related activities (Public Safety Canada, 2014). RCMP projects funded by the CTCBP cover topics ranging from leadership development, surveillance, interview techniques, basic investigation techniques, money laundering, major case management, and behavioral observation techniques (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2014). Canadian officials expect that these attempts to improve the capacity of other countries to respond to terrorist activities successively will help to reduce the terrorist threat towards Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.
Summary

This chapter outlined the institutional, organizational and operational dimensions of counter-terrorism policing in Canada and Turkey from a critical and comparative perspective. Guided by theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism that define and structure police strategies and on-the-ground actions, this chapter examined similarities and differences between Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism policing. The data was obtained from analysis and synthesis of documents and reports on the topic as they relate to the two countries.

In the next chapter, I summarize the findings of my analysis. I also discuss the findings and offer some policy recommendations and directions for future research.
Chapter VI
Discussion and Conclusion

Police agencies are a critical component in combating terrorism. Criminology literature focusing on the study of terrorism is sparse, and much less has been written about the policing of terrorism (Deflem, 2010; Lum et al., 2009; Perliger et al., 2009). This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature dealing with terrorism and counter-terrorism. It puts forth a comparative examination of the counter-terrorism strategies and measures of the Turkish and Canadian police services, the TNP and the RCMP, based on underlying theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism. Through institutional, organizational and operational level of analysis, I have tried to examine how each police service focuses on and responds to matters of terrorism. In this chapter, I summarize the findings of this study regarding Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism policing. In doing so, I also offer some policy implications for both police organizations. Finally, I offer directions for future research in the last part of this chapter.

Findings of the institutional level of analysis indicate that the historical experience with terrorism and the historical development of each country’s policing structures have shaped the police response to terrorism in Turkey and Canada. Turkey has experienced terrorist activities and national security concerns from its inception in 1923 to the present. On the other hand, although Canada has recently witnessed a substantial increase in the domestic and international terrorist threat (CSIS, 2015), it has been relatively unaffected by domestic and international acts of terrorism (Edwards et al., 2015). Policing in Canada has not confronted a constant existential-strategic threat which Turkey has faced. Turkey has faced persistent ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism threat against the ongoing integrity and sovereignty of the nation state. These different situations had their own impact on the development of Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism policing.
In terms of the general development of policing structures, the analysis shows that there are differences between the two countries at the institutional level. Canada has a decentralized system of policing involving federal, provincial and municipal police agencies. Policing in Turkey is highly centralized and police organizations are linked to a unified command structure, which may facilitate a coordinated response to terrorism by the police units. As Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 163) argue, TNP’s operating as a national agency “facilitated a deliberate connection with centralized intelligence gathering and investigating processes”. In Canada, where the policing is distributed across many administrative jurisdictions, coordination mechanisms such as joint task forces or fusion centers (such as INSETs and NSESs within the RCMP’s NSCI program) appear to be the most suitable tools for the flow and management of information exchange and police response to terrorism. In Canada, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) of the RCMP is a good example of cooperation among federal, provincial and municipal police and intelligence resources in order to collect, share and analyze information about criminal threats to national security and criminal extremism/terrorism.

As a policy implication, it can be argued that the establishment of structures in Turkey such as INSETs may be beneficial for enhancing cooperation between the Turkish police and the units of other security agencies such as the Turkish Gendarmerie and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization. Although the highly centralized nature of Turkish policing ensures a high level of coordination between police departments and units in dealing with terrorism related matters, such a coordination mechanism may improve the cooperation and coordination between different Turkish government agencies having a counter-terrorism mandate. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of such integration mechanisms should be consistently evaluated and necessary steps should be taken to ensure that the joint work is not plagued by problems such as an absence of a
shared ethic among agencies, limitations on sharing information, dominance of certain agencies, and the agencies’ withholding information from each other.

Another finding of this study is that both the TNP and the RCMP have relied on domestic criminal law and the anti-terror legislation of their respective countries in addressing terrorism. The legislation in both Turkey and Canada employ a broad definition of terrorism which provide law enforcement and security agencies with a broad area to act with matters of terrorism. However, the Turkish legal definition of terrorism does not include the neo-liberal provisions reflected in the Canadian definition of terrorism such as the targeting of corporations or serious disruption of a private essential service, facility or system. There are also differences between the Turkish and the Canadian legislation in terms of criminalizing membership in terrorist groups, as well as the advocacy, glorification and encouragement of terrorism. These differences in legal provisions determine the differences between the RCMP and the TNP on the subject of targeting potential terrorists.

From an organizational perspective, there are also similarities and differences between the TNP and the RCMP. Both the TNP and the RCMP have created specialized units in order to address terrorism and intelligence issues. Forces responding to terrorism in both countries are primarily police services. However, this task is imposed on special branches and units inside the police organizations. Although both Turkey and Canada legally treat terrorism as a criminal act, the police units dealing with terrorism issues are not the same units dealing with ordinary criminal offences. The separation and specialization of the units inside the police departments dealing with terrorism and national security issues has an historical background in both Turkey and Canada.

The intelligence role of the police is highly developed and has historical roots and contemporary stems in Turkey. In Canada, on the other hand, the intelligence role of the police
has been restricted. In Turkey, there has been considerably more intelligence gathering and local surveillance on matters of terrorism and a significant proportion of the criminal and domestic security intelligence has been produced by the TNP’s Intelligence Department and its affiliated units. On the other hand, the intelligence role of the RCMP in counter-terrorism which was weakened by the establishment of the CSIS in 1984, has been revitalized by the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001. Since terrorism and related activities were defined as crimes, the law enforcement imperatives of the Anti-Terrorism Act led the RCMP to promptly improve its intelligence capacity to combat terrorism (Rudner, 2004). The analysis shows that both organizations enjoy current intelligence powers including wiretapping, physical and electronic surveillance, and the use of HUMINT operations.

In terms of intelligence sharing and cooperation between security agencies, Canada and the RCMP embraced the idea of integrated policing and partnerships in countering-terrorism post 9/11, and have attached significant importance since then to the promotion of counter-terrorist intelligence sharing between agencies with national security or public safety responsibilities. According to Kitchen (2014), the recommendations put forward by two significant commissions of inquiry, the Major Commission on the Air India bombings and the O’Connor Commission on the Maher Arar investigation, are fundamentally important for the establishment of integrated policing structures and information sharing between Canadian security agencies. The INSETs of the RCMP and the ITAC demonstrate a recognition of the need for increased integration and coordination within the federal government with respects to threats to national security. When compared to Canada, counter-terrorism in Turkey has also been occasionally plagued by inter-agency turf wars, a lack of cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing between the agencies being mandated to pursue national security responsibilities. The effectiveness and functionality of
the newly established structures for promoting effective information sharing and inter agency cooperation between security forces in Turkey are, yet to be tested over time.

As a policy implication, it can be argued that some initiatives developed for increasing cooperation between the RCMP and the CSIS may be helpful for expanding existing collaboration between the TNP and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT). In this context, joint training initiatives may be promoted for providing mutual support consistent with respective mandates, and joint workshops may be created allowing employees of each organization to share ideas, learn about each other’s mandates, and elaborate ways in which they could work in a more cooperative and effective manner (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). Although the criminal and tactical intelligence gathering capacity of the TNP is highly developed and has so far induced successful anti-terror operations, the TNP may highly benefit from the strategic and foreign security intelligence gathering capabilities of the MIT. On the other hand, MIT may benefit from the broad experience of the TNP in HUMINT operations. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), like the one signed between the CSIS and the RCMP, may be signed between the TNP and the MIT which will govern the relationship between the two agencies together with the relevant legislative provisions. This memorandum will deal with the exchange of information and intelligence and set out guiding principles for the relationship between the two organizations.

Operationally, a finding of this research is that the RCMP enjoy broader investigative powers compared to the TNP. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) enacted by the Canadian government in 2001 provided the police, including the RCMP, with new powers in relation to terrorism investigations. These included a new power of preventive arrests and a power of investigative hearings. Although these powers expired in 2007 due to a
sunset provision in the ATA, they were nevertheless re-enacted by the legislation. The Anti-
Terrorism Act also provided enhanced electronic surveillance provisions. Recently, Bill C-51
passed in 2015 amends certain legislation in order to further expand the powers of Canadian
security agencies including the RCMP. The Turkish anti-terrorism legislation and legislation
regulating the duties and the powers of the police in Turkey do not provide the Turkish National
Police with such broad investigative powers in dealing with terrorism compared to the ones
provided to the RCMP in the wake of 9/11. The TNP make use of a number of investigative powers
including electronic surveillance, search and arrest powers in terrorism investigations. However,
members of the TNP do not have a preventive arrest power or a power of investigative hearing in
investigating or preventing terrorism offences.

This research has illustrated that the TNP’s IPA activities and the initiatives developed by
the RCMP as part of the Prevent framework have similar goals. In addition to traditional
investigation and police intervention methods in counter-terrorism process, both agencies perform
prevention-centered counter-terrorism activities such as the engagement by the police of at-risk
individuals and communities and intervention to radicalization leading to violence. However, an
important finding of this research is that the culture of prevention is more established in the TNP
compared to the RCMP. The two organizations also differ in some points within the context of the
implementation of preventive activities. While the TNP’s IPA activities and ICPA model aim at
the prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism as well as de-radicalization and
disengagement of radicalised individuals and suspected or convicted terrorists, the main focus of
the RCMP’s NSCO and CVE programs is on the intervention and the pre-emption of risks. In this
regard, the RCMP’s programming has more of a counter-radicalization nature and does not seem
to have much concern for reintegrating individuals into society or at least dissuading them from violence.

A number of policy implications may be offered with regards to the preventative actions of both police services. First, the counter-radicalization and de-radicalization/disengagement efforts of the TNP within the context of the IPA approach are comprehensive and the statistical data from police departments in Turkey seem promising. However, an in-depth evaluation and more empirical data is needed to test whether these programs are actually effective. One should always keep in mind that most governments and organizations running such programs are selective about the data they consider to make public and hence, the need for critical assessment of such data (Schmid, 2013b). The RCMP also should continue its community engagement activities through its NSCO program. However, these community outreach efforts would benefit from systematic evaluations in order to demonstrate operational success. Edwards et al. (2015) suggest that the RCMP community outreach initiatives lack a clear overall strategy that permits a baseline assessment of activities. Therefore, a coherent national strategy offered by the RCMP Headquarters, closer coordination between the engagement teams and a formal evaluation framework for engagement activities are recommended. These recommendations can potentially lead to improvements and changes that are informed by evidence based performance rather than traditional practices.

Although the nature of the terrorist threat that Turkey and Canada face differs in some points, the RCMP still may benefit from the experience of the Turkish National Police on the prevention of terrorism. The RCMP needs to focus its attention on the re-socialization and re-integration of ex-members and radicalized individuals to routine life as well as the prevention and disruption of terror plots through addressing the radicalization leading to violent extremism.
Although it may be difficult to export a program because its methods are so country-specific, the RCMP still could study the TNP’s de-radicalization/disengagement programs and create its own. While hard-line counter-terrorism measures such as covert intelligence gathering, enhanced surveillance and expanded police powers seem to be the preferred methods for the RCMP, an individually-tailored intervention program may prevent another Martin Couture-Rouleau or Michael Zehaf-Bibeau.

Edwards et al. (2015) talk about “the lack of a ‘mentality’ open to ‘Prevent’ activities” among RCMP members (p. xi). Findings of this research confirm this fact. An analysis of the counter-terrorism policing activities of the RCMP illustrates that the Prevent activities are not as comprehensive as other disruption activities. In fact, an examination of Canada’s official counter-terrorism strategy as well shows that the programs and activities within the Prevent element are not as extensive as the initiatives within Detect, Deny and Respond elements of the strategy. Therefore, an institutional change of mind among RCMP members regarding the importance and priority of the Prevent activities is necessary. As Edwards et al. (2015) suggest, a perception of glory about Prevent activities as much as high-profile arrests and other Deny activities should be encouraged. Moreover, additional financial resources and training should be dedicated to Prevent initiatives.

Another recommendation for both police agencies in their prevent activities is to ensure a strong sense of legitimacy among the public regarding the fairness of the judicial and the political system. These type of programs should not be regarded as targeting specific individuals or communities based on their ethnic background or religious faith.

Another finding of this research is related to the training of counter-terrorism officers serving in the TNP and the RCMP. Both police organizations train their counter-terrorism staff
with a view for increasing their expertise and specific knowledge about terrorism and terrorist offences, counter-terrorism, terrorism investigations, and intelligence and national security matters. They also do this not only on local level but on a global scale through trainings and capacity-building programs provided to foreign partner states’ law enforcement institutions. An important finding is that the RCMP operate a training initiative which is dedicated specifically to enhancing frontline police officers’ awareness on key indicators of terrorist activities, and techniques and practices in order to help identify terrorist threats at the earliest stage possible. However, despite encountering a distinctively higher level of terrorism threat, the TNP do not operate a training program which aims at strengthening the awareness of frontline police officers on terrorist activities. A training program along those lines of preparing frontline officers may be beneficial for the TNP patrol officers particularly in dealing with indicators of suicide terrorism.

Given the findings stated above, I argue that both Turkey and Canada have adopted an extended form of the criminal justice model in combating terrorism. The institutional, organizational and operational levels of analysis show that the TNP and the RCMP’s historical experience with terrorism and the historical development of each country’s policing structures have impacted the counter-terrorism model selected. In Turkey, although those in charge frequently elected to counter terror through the war model, particularly in the early stages of the separatist terrorism, a democratization process of Turkey has gradually pervaded over the years. This, together with an improving professionalism and success in eliminating terrorist threat proliferating in urban centres, have resulted in TNP’s extensive engagement in the prevention and detection of terrorist activities and the adoption of criminal justice and expanded criminal justice models.
There are certain milestones in Canadian terrorism and counter-terrorism experience which influenced the adoption of various counter-terrorism models. These milestones are the October Crisis of 1970, bombing of the Air India Flight 182, 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the extraordinary rendition and subsequent torture of Syrian-Canadian citizen Maher Arar. Findings of this research illustrate that Canada and the RCMP have employed all of the three counter-terrorism models since the launch of FLQ terrorist campaign until today. However, based on the institutional, organizational, and operational analysis of the counter-terrorism measures of the RCMP, it can be argued that especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks Canadian authorities tended to employ an expanded form of the criminal justice approach in dealing with terrorism. Elements of the expanded criminal justice model including preventive/administrative arrests, placing limitations on the rights of suspected terrorists, expanding the freedom of action of the security forces battling terrorism, broadening the powers of the police and the civilian intelligence agencies, regulations facilitating the collection and sharing of intelligence by security forces were extensively embraced by the post 9/11 Canadian counter-terrorism.

The provisions of the Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, encourage and facilitate information sharing between Canadian government agencies, expand the powers of Canada’s spy agency, lower the threshold for preventive arrests, and allow the Minister of Public Safety to add anyone to the no-fly list on mere suspicion that he/she will engage in an act that would threaten transportation security or travel by air for the purpose of committing an act of terrorism (Parliament of Canada, 2015; Ruby & Hasan, 2015). This suggests that the expanded criminal justice model has been institutionalized as the dominant doctrine in the struggle against terrorism. Moreover, new powers provided to the CSIS by the Bill C-51 will allow Canada’s spy agency to take any
measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada. This is an overly broad expression. This leads us to argue that Canada, at some point, seems to embrace a war model which assumes that terrorism is a serious threat that must be fought aggressively with military forces and civilian intelligence agencies (Perliger et al., 2009).

In sum, although both organizations historically responded to terrorism within the framework of different approaches, the findings based on an analysis of contemporary counter-terrorism measures of the TNP and the RCMP emphasize that an extended form of the criminal justice model is the preferred approach for both law enforcement organizations today. The findings, however, indicate that despite the relatively lower level of terrorist threat Canada faces, its security agencies including the RCMP increasingly enjoy stricter counter-terrorism measures such as enhanced intelligence, surveillance and broader investigative powers and a higher level of integration and coordination in counter-terrorism. I argue that this is what Roach (2011) calls “the 9/11 effect” on Canadian counter-terrorism. Moreover, findings of this research show that the RCMP allocate little space for prevent actions in its counter-terrorism agenda compared to the TNP.

Directions for Future Research

This research has mainly relied on an analysis of official and non-official documents and other secondary data sources. The researcher’s professional observations within the scope of his appointment in Turkish National Police (TNP) also provided data for this thesis. However, future studies making such comparative analyses of counter-terrorism measures of certain organizations should include fieldwork interviews with law-enforcement practitioners. In terms of the data

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Section 12.1(1) of the proposed Act states,

*If there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada, the Service may take measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce the threat.*
collection methods used for this study, a limitation can be the lack of field interviews with practitioners, particularly on the RCMP side.

Future research should address issues relating to post-incidence responses to terrorism which were not covered in this thesis. These issues involve emergency assistance at terrorist incidents, order maintenance when terrorism occurs, and mitigation of terrorist damage.

This thesis has focused on a general comparison of the TNP’s and the RCMP’s response to terrorism. Future research may address one specific counter-terrorism policy in a more detailed fashion. For example, the nature and the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policies of both police agencies may further be discussed in an empirical study using data obtained from interviews with practitioners and official statistics.

The scope of this thesis is limited to the counter-terrorism policies and strategies of law enforcement agencies of Turkey and Canada. Future research should compare and contrast both countries’ response to terrorism through making an analysis of the social, economic, military, intelligence and international dimensions of the Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism policies.
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